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10.1 Introduction
This paper compares the cyclical behavior ofa number ofindustrial
labor markets of the prewar (1923-39) and postwar (1954-82) eras.
The methodology follows that of the traditional Burns and Mitchell
(1946) business cycle analysis in at least two ways. First, the data
employed are relatively disaggregated (we use monthly dataat the two-
orthree-digit industry level). Second, we have not formulated or tested
a specific structural model oflabor markets during the cycle but instead
concentrate on measuring qualitative features ofthe data. As did Burns
and Mitchell, we see descriptive analysis ofthe dataas a useful prelude
to theorizing about business cycles. Thus, although the research re-
ported here permits no direct structural inferences, it should be useful
in restricting the class of structural models or hypotheses that may
subsequently be considered.
The principal questions we study are also two in number. First, what
are the means by which labor input is varied over the business cycle?
We consider the intensity of utilization (as measured by gross labor
productivity), hours of work per week, and number of workers em-
ployed.Both the timing and the relative magnitudes of the changes in
these quantities over the cycle are examined. Second, what are the
relationships over the cycle of output and labor input to measures of
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laborcompensation? We look at the cyclical behavior ofproduct wages
and real weekly earnings as well as ofreal wages.
As mightbeexpected, manyofourfindings are notnovel; rather, they
tend to supportand perhaps refine existingperceptions ofcyclical labor
market behavior. However, we do reveal some interesting differences
between the prewar and postwar periods in the relative use oflayoffs
and short hours in downturns and in cyclical movements ofthe real wage.
Another finding is that labor productivity may behave in an anomalous
mannerin more severe recessions. Finally, a numberofthe familiar reg-
ularities are documentedin a previously little-used data set, overan un-
usually long sample period, and by means ofsome alternative methods.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 10.2 reviews previous
empirical work on the cyclical behavior of labor market variables.
Sections 10.3 and 10.4 introduce and describe the data set used here.
The behavior of key variables over the business cycle is analyzed by
frequency domain methods in section 10.5 and by a time domain ap-
proachin section 10.6. Section 10.7focuses onlabormarketphenomena
in four particularly severe recessions. Results are summarized and
conclusions drawn in section 10.8.
10.2 Previous Work: Some Regularities and Some Puzzles
There has been a great deal ofempirical work that relates, sometimes
directly and sometimes tangentially, to the cyclical behavior of labor
markets. Without attempting an exhaustive survey, in this section we
will try to summarize the major empirical findings ofthe literature. We
will also include some brief discussion of how various authors have
interpreted these findings. However, because the focus of this paper
is description rather than structural analysis, the results we will present
later do little to resolve existing disputes about interpretation.
The discussion ofthis section will be organized around the two ques-
tions ofinterest raised in section 10.1: the means by which labor input
is varied over the cycle and the cyclical relationship oflabor input and
labor compensation. It might be said that by concentrating on these
two questions, rather than on such phenomena as the frequency and
duration ofunemployment spells or cyclical variations in participation
rates, we are emphasizing the "demand side" of the labor market at
the expense ofthe "supply side." This imbalance is unfortunate but is
dictated by the nature of the available prewar data. 1
10.2.1 The Cyclical Pattern of Labor Utilization
The earliest empirical work on the variation of labor input over the
cycle was done in thecontextofNBERbusiness cycle research. Among
1. This is not to say that no empirical work on cyclical aspects oflabor supply exists
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the hundreds ofdata series whose business cycle patterns were pains-
takingly analyzed by Wesley Mitchell, and laterby Mitchell and Arthur
Burns, were a numberoflabor market variables. Forexample, Mitchell
(1951) documented the high conformity of employment and weekly
hours with output. (However, Mitchell was perhaps more interested in
labor cost measures; see below.)
An early NBER finding was the strong tendency of weekly hours
(that is, the length of the average workweek) to lead output and em-
ployment over the cycle (Moore 1955; Bry 1959). Weekly hours sub-
sequently became a component of the NBER's well-known index of
leading indicators. (For a relatively recent discussion and updating of
this index, see Zarnowitz and Boschan 1975.) Otherlabor market vari-
ables identified as leading the cycle by the NBER included accession
and layoffrates and initial claims for unemployment insurance (Shiskin
1961). Employment and unemployment Wlere found to be coincident
with the cycle.
Arguably the most important contribution of the NBER research
program in this area was the classic paper by Hultgren (1960). With
the purpose ofinvestigating a hypothesis ofMitchell's aboutlaborcost,
Hultgren collected monthly data on output, aggregate hours worked,
and payrolls for twenty-three industries. (The sample period was 1932-
58.) With these and other data, Hultgren discovered that output per
worker-houris procyclical (or equivalently, that employmentand hours
worked vary relatively less over the cycle than does output).
Thefinding ofprocyclicallaborproductivity, or"short-runincreasing
returns to labor" (SRIRL), spawneda volunlinous literature. Important
early contributions were made by Kuh (1960, 1965), Okun (1962), Eck-
stein and Wilson (1964), and Brechling (1965). (Okun's famous ~~law"
is, of course, SRIRL applied to the aggregate economy.) These and
numerous other studies (including, notably, Ball and St. Cyr 1966;
Masters 1967; BrechlingandO'Brien 1967; andIrelandand Smyth 1967)
found the SRIRL phenomenon to be ubiquitous: it occurs at both high
and low levels of output aggregation, for both production and non-
production workers, and in virtually all industrial countries.
Because of the neoclassical presumption of diminishing marginal
returns to factors ofproduction, SRIRL originally was perceived (and
to some extent still is) as a deep puzzle. One favored explanation was
that, because ofthe existence ofspecific hUlnan capital, firms "hoard"
labor during downturns (Oi 1962; Solow 1968; Fair 1969); the hoarded
labor is utilized more fully as demand recovers, giving the illusion of
increasing returns. For empirical purposes, the labor hoarding model
has become closely identified with a model in which increasing marginal
costs of adjusting the labor stock induce the firm to move toward the
desired level ofemployment only gradually (Brechling 1965; Coen and
Hickman 1970); conceptually, however, the two models are not quite586 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. PoweU
the same. AnotherpopularexplanationofSRIRLis thatit is a reflection
ofunobserved (by the econometrician) variations in capital utilization
rates that are associated with changes in laborinput (Ireland and Smyth
1967; Lucas 1970; Solow 1973; Nadiri and Rosen 1973; Tatom 1980).
What is probably the most general current view is that SRIRL is the
outcome of a complex dynamic optimization problem solved by the
firm, in which labor is only one of a number of inputs, each with a
possibly different degree ofquasi-fixity. Forexample, Nadiri and Rosen
(1973) emphasized that the rate at which employment will be varied
depends not only on the costs ofadjusting labor stocks but also on the
costs of adjusting all other inputs (including inventories and rates of
utilization); Morrison and Berndt (1981) showed that these interactions
could result in the SRIRL phenomenon even if labor itself were a
perfectly variable factor.
Overall, the research that followed Hultgren's original paper has made
two valuable contributions to knowledge. First, from Brechling (1965)
to Nadiri and Rosen (1973) to Sims (1974), there has been generated a
wealth ofempirical material on the sluggish short-run response ofem-
ployment to outputchange and on the relationship overthe cycleofem-
ploymenttohours worked, inventories, andotherfactors ofproduction.
Second, thegeneraldynamic optimizationmodeloffirm inpututilization
developed in this literature has proved to be a most useful and flexible
research tool. (For example, it has permitted the incorporation of ra-
tional expectations; see Sargent 1978 or Pindyck and Rotemberg 1982.)
We may summarize the received findings on the cyclical behavior of
labor inputs as follows: Employment and weekly hours are procyclical.
Productivity is also procyclical; that is, employment and worker-hours
vary less than output overthe cycle. Finally, weekly hours lead output,
while employmentcoincides with orpossiblylags outputoverthecycle.
10.2.2 Labor Compensation over the Cycle
Although the qualitative behavior of labor inputs over the business
cycle seems relatively well established, there is very little agreement
about how to characterize the cyclical movements of labor compen-
sation, especially of real wages. The debate about real wages began
when Keynes (1936) conjectured that, again because of diminishing
marginal returns, labor's marginal productivityandhence the'real wage
should be countercyclical.2 Empirical studies by Dunlop (1938) and
Tarshis (1939) purported to show that this conjecture was false; but
these studies were in tum disputed (see Bodkin 1969 for references).
2. Bodkin 1969 notes that the French economist Rueff made the same prediction in
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The debate prompted Keynes (1939) to aver that countercyclical real
wages were in fact not an essential implication of his theory.
Postwarresearchhas done little to resolve the questionofthe cyclical
behavior ofreal wages. One can find papers supporting procyclicality
(Bodkin 1969; Stockman 1983), countercyclicality(Neftci 1978; Sargent
1978; Otani 1978; Chirinko 1980), and acyclicality (Geary and Kennan
1982). Altonji and Ashenfelter (1980) have argued that the best statis-
tical model ofthe real wage is the random \valk. It would not be much
help for us to present a detailed comparison of these papers here.
Instead, we simply list some of the major methodological issues that
have arisen in this literature.
First, researchers have typically found that these results are sensitive
to whether the nominal wage is deflated by an index ofoutput prices,
such as the wholesale price index or the producer price index or by a
cost-of-living index such as the consumer price index. (See Ruggles
1940; Bodkin 1969; or Geary and Kennan 1982.) This does not seem
unreasonable, since the wage divided by the output price (henceforth
the "product wage") corresponds conceptually to the "demandprice"
of labor, while the wage deflated by the cost of living (henceforth the
"real wage") corresponds to the "supply price"; it is not difficult to
think of conditions under which the short-run behaviors of these two
variables might differ. Unfortunately, however, the difference in be-
havior does not seem to vary systematically across studies.
Second, there is some dispute over whether the contemporaneous
correlationofthereal wage andoutput(orenlployment) is aninteresting
measure ofthe real wage's cyclical pattern. Neftci (1978) and Sargent
(1978) have argued that, because ofthe complex dynamics ofthe wage/
employment relationship, it is necessary to look at correlations at many
leads and lags. (See also Clark and Freeman 1980.)
Finally, it has been founded that empirical results concerning the
short-runbehaviorofwages may beparticularly sensitivetoaggregation
biases, both when the aggregation is over individuals (Stockman 1983)
and when it is over industries (Chirinko 1980).
The apparently very weak relationship offealwages and the business
cycle has posed a problem for some proIIlinent theories of cyclical
fluctuations (or at least for simple versions of those theories; see, for
example, Altonji and Ashenfelter 1980 and Ashenfelter and Card 1982).
However, attempts to reconcile the low cOITelation of wages and the
cycle with theories ofshort-run employment fluctuations have also led
toa numberofinterestinglines ofresearch: theseinclude disequilibrium
modeling of the cycle (Solow and Stiglitz 1968; Barro and Grossman
1971), contracting approaches that divorce wage payments and short-
run labor allocations (see Hall 1980 for a discussion), Lucas's (1970)
theory ofcapacity and overtime, and others.588 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
Real and product wages are not the only measures of labor com-
pensationwhose cyclicalbehaviorhas been studied, althoughthey have
absorbed a large part ofthe research effort. Mitchell theorized in very
early work that unit labor costs might play an important role in the
business cycle; Hultgren's (1960, 1965) studies found that, in reason-
ably close correspondence to Mitchell's prediction, labor costs lag the
cycle. Various other compensation measures were studied by the NBER
analysts: nominal labor income, for example, was reported by Shiskin
(1961) to be coincident with the cycle.
Another variable that has commanded some attention is the nominal
wage. In an NBER Occasional Paper, Creamer (1950) studied monthly
wage rates in a number ofindustries for 1919-31. (His aggregate wage
rate series extended to 1935.) Creamer's most important conclusion
was that nominal wage rates lagged business activity by nine months
or more, a finding that some subsequent authors viewed as supporting
the "stickiness" of wages. (Creamer also showed that the cyclical
behaviors of an index of wage rates and of average hourly earnings
were similar, a very useful resultgiven the paucity ofdirect information
on wage rates.) "Stickiness" was also a major issue for later students
ofthe nominal wage: for example, Sachs (1980) has argued that wages
became relatively more rigid after World War II, and Gordon (1982)
has found United States postwar wages to be stickier than those ofthe
United Kingdom and Japan. Gordon's result is the opposite of earlier
characterizations by Sachs (1979) and others.
Overall, the question ofhow to characterize the cyclical behavior of
laborcompensationremains ratherunsettled. This is unfortunate, given
the central role of wages in much of macroeconomic theory.
10.3 The Data
This paper reassesses the qualitative empirical findings described in
the previous section, with particular attention to possible differences
between the prewar and postwar eras. This section introduces ourdata
set and compares it briefly with what has been employed by others.
The data we use are monthly, roughly at the level ofthe "industry,"
and cover the time periods 1923-39 and 1954-82. We felt that the high-
frequency data were necessary if short-run relationships were to be
distinguished; the industry-level data were used both to reduce aggre-
gation bias and to avoid reliance on the aggregate production indexes,
which are poorly constructed for our purpose (see below). In contrast
to our approach, few studies since Hultgren have used monthly, industry-
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has used prewar data; the exceptions have typically looked only at
annual, highly aggregated numbers.
There were many variables we could have chosen to study. Consid-
erations ofdataavailability and economic relevance led to thefollowing








Industry output or production
Employment (number of production workers)
Hours of work per week (per production worker)
Gross labor productivity = IP/(EMP x HRS)
Average hourly earnings (nominal) divided by a cost-of-
living index; the "real wage."
Average hourly earnings divided by the industry whole-
sale output price; the "product wage"
Real weekly earnings per production worker = HRS x
WR.
In the analysis below, we concentrate not on the levels of these vari-
ables but on the log differences (roughly, the monthly growth rates).
From now on, therefore, the mnemonic na.mes just defined should be
understood to denote log differences.
Thevariables abovewerecollectedforeightprewarmanufacturing, eight
postwarmanufacturing,andthreepostwarnonmanufacturingindustries.
These industries are listed in table 10.1. Note that the eight prewar and
postwarmanufacturingindustries are approximately a "matchedset." This
was done to facilitate comparisonofthe two eras. We did not have com-
Table 10.1 Industries Included in Data Set
Prewar Industry Title Postwar Industry Title (SIC code)
Manufacturing Industries (prewar and postwar data)
1. Iron and steel (STEEL) Blast furnaces and steel mills (331)
2. Automobiles (AUTOS) Motor vehicles and equipment (371)
3. Meat-packing (MEAT) Meat-packing plants (201)
4. Paper and pulp (PAPER) Paper and allied products (26)
5. Boots and shoes (SHOES) Footw(~ar, except rubber (314)
6. Wool textiles (WOOL) Weaving and finishing mills, wool (223)
7. Leather tanning and finishing Leather tanning and finishing (311)
(LEATH)
8. Lumber and millwork (excluding Lumber and wood products (24)
furniture (LUMBR)





Nonmanufacturing Industries (postwar data only)
Bituminous coal and lignite mining (12)
Electric services (491)
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parableprewardataforthethreenonmanufacturingindustries. However,
we included these industries because they represent major sectors of
the economy (mining, utilities, and construction) and becauseit seemed
to us that nonmanufacturing industries have been slighted somewhat
(relative to manufacturing industries) by students ofthe business cycle.
Some explanation should be given for the rather miscellaneous char-
acter of the manufacturing industries chosen. For the prewar period,
the eight industries included represent the largest class for which com-
plete and reasonably consistent data were available. In particular, our
desire to have series on hours of work restricted us to industries reg-
ularly surveyed, beginning in the early 1920s, by the National Industrial
Conference Board. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which surveyed
many more industries, did not collect hours data before 1932. Also,
we included only industries whose outputindexes were based on direct
measures ofphysical output (e.g., number ofautomobiles) rather than
on scaled-up input measures (e.g., man-hours). A wider selection of
industries is available for the postwar period, of course, but because
ofthe burden ofcollecting and entering the data, only those manufac-
turing industries "matching" the available prewarindustries wereused.
In terms of employment or value added, the industries here studied
made up about one-fifth of total manufacturing in the prewar era and
about one-sixth of total manufacturing after the war.
A nice fringe benefit ofusing the Conference Board data rather than
that from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is that it gives us a
prewar data set that has not been previously analyzed, except in a
partial and desultory way by some earlier NBER studies. In particular,
it is quite different from the data set used by Hultgren (1960).
A potential problem with studying only manufacturing industries that
have more or less continuous identities since the 1920s is that it biases
the sample toward older, often declining industries at the expense of
new and growing fields. However, for the purpose ofstudying cyclical
(as opposed to trend) behavior of labor market variables, this sample
bias is probably not important. In particular, our informal comparisons
ofthe declining manufacturing industries with the expanding manufac-
turing and nonmanufacturing industries did not reveal obvious differ-
ences in cyclical behavior.
For the purposes ofcomparison with the industry-level findings, we
also analyzed prewar and postwar monthly data for aggregate manu-
facturing. Although these data obviously have broader coverage than
the industry data, we have less confidence in the results using aggre-
gates, for three reasons: (1) aggregation across industries introduces
well-known cyclical biases; (2) the aggregate production indexes are
heavily contaminated with input-based measures ofoutput; and (3) the
prewar output, price, and labor input series are not perfectly mutually591 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
consistent. (See the data appendix to this chapter for an explanation
and for a more detailed discussion ofall the data and their sources.)
10.4 Some Basic Statistics
Most ofthe analysis below follows the application ofa deseasonal-
ization process and the removal of means from the log-differenced
series. As a preliminary step, this section looks at some features ofthe
raw log differences.
Tables 10.2 and 10.3 present the means of the variables for each
industry and for the prewarand postwarperiods separately. The means
are multiplied by 100 and thus can be interpreted approximately as
percentage rates ofgrowth per month.
Considering first the productivity column in table 10.2, we note that
average prewar rates ofproductivity growth compared well with those
of the postwar era. Rates of productivity growth were higher during
1923-39 than during 1954-82 in five ofthe eight manufacturing indus-
tries, as well as in aggregate manufacturing. The prewar rate of pro-
18ble 10.2 Monthly Rates of Growth (lfo) of Output, Employment, Weekly
Roon, and Productivity
Industry Period IP EMP HRS PROD
STEEL 1923-39 0.18 0.07 -0.25 0.35
1954-82 -0.12 -0.26 -0.01 0.14
AUTOS 1923-39 0.34 0.07 -0.14 0.42
1954-82 0.16 -0.09 0.00 0.25
MEAT 1923-39 0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.07
1954-82 0.18 0.02 -0.01 0.17
PAPER 1923-39 0.33 0.06 -0.12 0.39
1954-82 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.29
SHOES 1923-39 0.01 -0.07 -0.14 0.22
1954-82 -0.13 -0.22 -0.01 0.10
WOOL 1923-39 0.04 -0.08 -0.12 0.24
1958-82 -0.14 -0.43 0.01 0.28
LEATH 1923-39 -0.09 -0.14 -0.10 0.15
1954-82 -0.17 -0..29 0.00 0.12
LUMBR 1923-39 -0.07 -0..14 -0.10 0.17
1954-82 0.18 -0..06 0.01 0.23
ALL 1923-39 0.22 -0.01 -0.12 0.34
MFG 1954-82 0.27 -0.02 0.00 0.29
COAL 1954-82 0.18 -0.13 0.06 0.26
ELECT 1954-82 0.48 0.11 0.00 0.36
CONST 1954-82 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.00592 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
ductivity growth reached rather exceptional levels in automobiles, pa-
per and pulp, and iron and steel. The rapid expansion of prewar
productivity observed in these data supports the view that the period
between the world wars (particularly the 1920s) was a time of trans-
formation of industrial technologies, leading to sharp reductions in
costs; see Jerome (1934) and Bernstein (1960). In the postwar period,
the best productivity performance among our manufacturing industries
was by paper and allied products; best overall in the postwar sample
was by electric services.
Productivity growth is, ofcourse, definitionally equal to output growth
minus the sum of employment and hours growth. Examining these
constituents ofproductivity, we note first thatthefastest prewargrowth
in output was experienced by automobiles and by paper and pulp; in
the postwar period, paper took the output growth honors for manu-
facturing, with electric services again doing best overall. It appears
that the high-output industries were also the high-productivity indus-
tries; the rank correlation between output growth and productivity
growth is .945 for the eight prewar industries, .913 for the eleven post-
war industries.
Despite the depression ofthe 1930s, employment growth in the pre-
war manufacturing industries studied tended to exceed that in their
post-war counterparts (seven ofeight cases); this was also true for the
aggregates. This difference largely reflects serious long-term declines
by a number ofthe postwar industries: in wool textiles, leather tanning
and finishing, and footwear, prewar tendencies toward decline accel-
erated after the war; in iron and steel, prewar growth in employment
changed to postwar shrinkage. The strongest employment growth in
the sample took place in two postwar nonmanufacturing industries
(electric services and construction). As a whole, the employment col-
umn of table 10.2 is consistent with the often-noted secular fall in the
fraction of total employment absorbed by manufacturing.
The behavior of the last component ofproductivity, hours ofwork,
was quite different in the two sample periods. Weekly hours declined
steadily during the prewar period in all industries, most precipitously
in iron and steel (a notorious "long-hours" industry during the early
1920s, in which eighty-four-hour workweeks were not uncommon).
This fall reflected changes in work organization during the 1920s (in a
few cases as a response to the pressure ofpublic opinion against long
hours) and the "work sharing" of the depressed 1930s (sometimes
initiated by employers, sometimes the result of New Deal legislation
orunion demands); see Zeisel (1958) for further discussion. In contrast,
the postwar workweek was almost perfectly stable.
Finally, we may consider the mean rates ofgrowth ofthe alternative
measures of production worker compensation (table 10.3). It is inter-593 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.3 Monthly Rates of Growth (0/0) of Real Wages, Product Wages, and
Real Weekly Earnings
Industry Period WR WP EARN
STEEL 1923-39 0.31 0.29 0.06
1954-82 0.16 0.10 0.15
AUTOS 1923-39 0.31 0.30 0.17
1954-82 0.11 0.16 0.11
MEAT 1923-39 0.29 0.29 0.21
1954-82 0.06 0.15 0.04
PAPER 1923-39 0.24 0.24 0.12
1954-82 0.13 0.15 0.13
SHOES 1923-39 0.11 -0.01 -0.03
1954-82 0.03 0.05 0.02
WOOL 1923-39 0.21 0.20 0.08
1958-82 0.05 0.31a 0.06
LEATH 1923-39 0.27 0.25 0.17
1954-82 0.05 0.03 0.05
LUMBR 1923-39 0.28 0.27 0.17
1954-82 0.09 0.13 0.10
ALLMFG 1923-39 0.26 0.27 0.14
1954-82 0.09 0.10 0.09
COAL 1954-82 0.12 -0.04 0.18
ELECT 1958-82 0.13 0.05b 0.13
CONST 1954-82 0.09 0.03 0.11
asample period is 1958-75.
bSample period is 1958-82.
esting that, though productivity gains during the prewar period were
larger than during the postwar period in only five of the eight manu-
facturing industries studied, real wage growth was significantly larger
during the prewar in all eight industries, as well as in the aggregate.
Prewar product wages also rose sharply, except in boots and shoes.
Within the major sample periods, the rank correlation of real wage
growth with productivity growth was .815 for the eight prewar indus-
tries, .864 for the eleven postwar industries. (Although these correla-
tions are high, note that they are somewhat lower than the correlations
of productivity and output growth reported above.) The large prewar
growth in real wages was not fully reflected in increases in worker
buying power, as the last column of table 10.3 shows; because of the
sharp declines in hours ofwork, real weekly earnings rose much more
slowly than real wages.
Turning from the first to the second mom.ents, tables 10.4 and 10.5
contain the standard deviations of the raw log differences, multiplied
by 100 so they can be interpreted as percentages. We will not comment
on these figures except to note, first, how surprisingly large the vari-594 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
Table 10.4 Standard Deviations (0/0) of Monthly Growth Rates of Output,
Employment, Weekly Hours, and Productivity
Industry Period IP EMP HRS PROD
STEEL 1923-39 13.40 4.70 6.85 8.00
1954-82 16.09 11.53 2.25 7.06
AUTOS 1923-39 30.12 10.37 8.13 22.47
1954-82 7.80 9.69 4.14 8.69
MEAT 1923-39 9.91 4.03 3.16 7.95
1954-82 2.82 1.80 1.84 3.87
PAPER 1923-39 5.71 1.83 2.47 5.15
1954-82 1.83 1.06 0.98 2.06
SHOES 1923-39 11.87 3.18 5.39 10.08
1954-82 4.05 2.86 2.58 5.63
WOOL 1923-39 12.04 6.09 4.93 8.64
1958-82 9.30 2.71 2.01 10.17
LEATH 1923-39 5.52 2.93 3.52 5.46
1954-82 3.39 2.32 1.71 4.82
LUMBR 1923-39 6.80 5.63 4.88 6.79
1954-82 2.85 2.47 1.87 3.62
ALLMFG 1923-39 4.70 2.36 2.59 2.92
1954-82 3.28 1.36 1.17 2.58
COAL 1954-82 14.00 16.05 8.18 11.74
ELECT 1954-82 1.45 0.91 0.91 1.94
CONST 1954-82 7.88 6.17 2.87 5.25
ability ofthe industry dataoften is and, second, that aggregation seems
to reduce measured variability somewhat. To see how much of total
variability was attributable to business cycles, we used a frequency
domain technique to wipe out the variance associated with the high-
frequency (seasonal) and the low-frequency (trending or long-wave)
bands. The resulting standard deviations for five key variables are in
table 10.6. Three facts are obvious from the table. First, the share of
total variability of the data to be associated with business cycles is
relatively small in both the prewar and postwar periods. Second, the
business cycle has dampened considerably during the postwar period.
Third, in most industries the cyclical variance of hours of work per
week has, between the prewar and postwar periods, been reduced
relatively more than that ofemployment.
This last observation, which is also confirmed in the raw data (table
10.4) and in section 10.7 below, is worth remarking on a bit further.
Why have postwar employers relied relatively more heavily on layoffs,
rather than on short workweeks, to reduce labor input in downturns?
Two possible sources ofthe change are the greaterpostwarimportance
ofunions and the advent ofunemployment insurance programs. Union
objective functions might be such that layoffs of a relatively small595 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.S Standard Deviations (%) of Monthly Growth Rates of Real Wages,
Product Wages, and Real Weekly I:arnings
Industry Period WR WP EARN
STEEL 1923-39 2.14 2.24 7.02
1954-82 1.32 1.50 2.96
AUTOS 1923-39 1.90 2.24 8.32
1954-82 1.69 1.87 5.21
MEAT 1923-39 2.24 4.81 3.25
1954-82 1.29 4.05 2.43
PAPER 1923-39 1.30 2.14 2.43
1954-82 0.83 3.61 1.36
SHOES 1923-39 2.70 2.47 5.41
1954-82 0.95 1.80 2.60
WOOL 1923-39 2.14 2.97 4.79
1958-82 1.06 1.48a 2.37
LEATH 1923-39 1.47 3.03 3.37
1954-82 0.92 2.96 2.12
LUMBR 1923-39 4.14 4.74 5.25
1954-82 1.32 1.99 2.37
ALL MFG 1923-39 1.24 1.48 2.55
1954-82 2.30 2.34 2.69
COAL 1954-82 1.95 2~ 19 9.04
ELECT 1954-82 0.90 1.11b 1.44
CONST 1954-82 1.05 1.02 2.80
aSample period is 1958- 75.
bSample period is 1958-82.
numberofjuniorworkers are preferred to a general reduction ofhours.
(Cross-sectional evidence that unions prefer layoffs was presented in
Medoff 1979. Medoff also cited a study by Slichter, Healy, and Liv-
ernash 1960 claiming that unions, which initially approved of some
work sharing, moved toward a preference for layoffs in the early post-
war period.) Perhaps more important than unionism is the fact that in
the United States, fully unemployed workers can receive government
compensation but the partially unemployed cannot. See Baily (1977)
for a formal analysis.
10.5 Analysis in the Frequency Domain
We turn now to the study ofthese variables over the business cycle.
To obtain characterizationsof''typical" cyclical patterns, we subjected
the data to both frequency domain and tinle domain analysis. In the
frequency domain work we followed the approach suggested by Gran-
ger and Hatanaka(1964); in the time domain our analysis is in the spirit















Standard Deviations (lfc) of Monthly Growth Rates of Five
Variables: Business Cycle Frequencies (Twelve to Ninety-Six
Months) Only
Period IP EMP HRS PROD WR
1923-39 3.96 1.59 1.73 1.53 0.59
1954-82 2.28 1.05 0.48 1.15 0.27
1923-39 4.54 2.72 1.46 2.93 0.36
1954-82 1.85 1.43 0.47 0.77 0.31
1923-39 1.66 1.05 0.49 1.01 0.49
1954-82 0.46 0.27 0.19 0.36 0.21
1923-39 1.33 0.60 0.65 0.76 0.36
1954-82 0.56 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.14
1923-39 1.26 0.47 0.94 0.78 0.68
1954-82 0.71 0.39 0.38 0.60 0.17
1923-39 3.16 1.69 1.06 0.99 0.67
1954-82 1.56 1.01 0.61 1.74 0.22
1923-39 1.19 0.97 0.77 0.82 0.47
1954-82 0.59 0.49 0.22 0.52 0.14
1923-39 1.75 1.48 0.85 1.19 0.70
1954-82 0.87 0.61 0.21 0.44 0.23
1923-39 1.53 0.97 0.67 0.48 0.33
1954-82 0.60 0.39 0.15 0.21 0.20
1954-82 0.92 0.71 0.61 0.84 0.25
1954-82 0.22 0.16 0.10 0.28 0.13
1954-82 0.69 0.75 0.21 0.77 0.15
these two approaches; this is evidenced by the similarity ofthe results
obtained.) The results from the frequency domain will be discussed
here. Those from the time domain are presented in section 10.6.
The data used in the frequency domain work (as well as in the time
domain) were the deseasonalized log differences of the basic series.
(Deseasonalization was done by the use ofseasonal dummies; see our
data appendix.) Each variable was analyzed separately by industry and
for the prewar and postwar sample periods.
Spectra ofthese data showed power in the business cycle frequency
range, but rarely were clear peaks apparent in that range. (Sargent
1979, 254, warns that this is to be expected.) We decided to investigate
the properties of cycles with periods exceeding one year (so as to
exclude remaining seasonal and other high-frequency influences) but
shorter than eight years. (According to the NBER chronology, the
longest business cycle in our sample-the one extending from 1929 to
1937-was eight years long.) For each industry/sample period, we cal-
culated the coherences and phase relationships of the variables over
the one- to eight-year band.
The coherences ofsix variables (the rates ofgrowth ofemployment,
weekly hours, productivity, real wages, productwages, and real weekly597 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
earnings) with the rate ofgrowth ofindustry output over the business
cycle range are reported in table 10.7. (Standard errors ofthe coherence
estimates are also included. See the appendix for a description ofhow
these were calculated.) Coherence is a measure of the degree of as-
sociation ofa pair of variables over a prescribed set offrequencies; a
coherence of zero indicates the minimum association, a coherence of
one the maximum. The table suggests that ernployment and hours bear
the strongest relation to output over the business cycle. Productivity
and earnings also are strongly related to output for most industries.
The connection between the two wage measures and output is erratic
across industries and, on the whole, is weaker; this is especially true
in the postwar period. Note, however, that the coherences of wages
and output appear to be statistically significant in both periods.
A particularly informative exercise in th(~ frequency domain is the
calculation ofphase relationships. For a given frequency, think ofvari-
ables as tracing out sine curves over time. Then the "phase lead" of
variable A with respect to variable B is the number of months after A
reaches a given point on its sinusoidal path that B reaches the corre-
sponding point. We shall say a variable that has a phase lead with
respect to output ofnear zero is "procyclical"; a variable whose phase
lead with respect to output is approximately half the period ofthe full
cycle is "countercyclical." (There are, how'ever, some caveats to this
interpretation of phase leads; see Hause 1971.)
The phase leads of six variables with respect to output growth, plus
standard errors, are given in table 10.8. The phase leads are evaluated
at the frequency with period of fifty-four months, the period at the
centerofthe range considered. (See the appendix for more discussion.)
We find that employment, hours, and earnings are roughly procyclical.
Productivity is procyclical but slightly leading in the postwar period;
its lead over output is greater in the prewar period. Hours typically
leads, though by less than productivity, while employment consistently
lags a few months behind output. Earnings is approximately coincident.
The interrelation ofproductivity, hours, output, and employment is
essentially stable between the prewar and postwar periods and, except
for the introduction of some subtleties in timing, is consistent with
earlier findings. In conjunction with the dynamic model of the firm
discussed in section 10.2, this interrelation suggests a simple economic
interpretation: cycles are dominated by denland changes. Firms antic-
ipating an increase in demand respond first by increasing nonlabor
inputs and asking for more work effort; this increases productivity. As
demand strengthens, hours ofwork expand. Finally, as the increase in
demand assumes greater permanence, firms make the hiring and train-
ing investments needed to add to the work force. This story is hardly
original (see, for example, Baily 1977), and we emphasize again that598 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. Powell
Table 10.7 Coherences of Growth Rates of Six Variables with Growth Rate of
Output
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
Prewar Data
STEEL .828 .883 .915 .272 .230 .854
(.060) (.042) (.031) (.175) (.179) (.051)
AUTOS .854 .583 .692 .252 .271 .568
(.051) (.125) (.099) (.177) (.175) (.128)
MEAT .773 .657 .836 .541 .330 .292
(.076) (.107) (.057) (.134) (.168) (.173)
PAPER .661 .870 .721 .610 .507 .836
(.106) (.046) (.091) (.119) (.140) (.057)
SHOES .717 .836 .651 .098 .142 .794
(.092) (.057) (.109) (.187) (.185) (.070)
WOOL .934 .878 .783 .449 .429 .797
(.024) (.043) (.073) (.151) (.154) (.069)
LEATH .754 .742 .341 .473 .634 .823
(.082) (.085) (.167) (.147) (.113) (.061)
LUMBR .749 .784 .276 .354 .659 .638
(.083) (.073) (.175) (.165) (.107) (.112)
ALLMFG .935 .916 .567 .567 .607 .902
(.024) (.031) (.128) (.128) (.119) (.035)
Postwar Data
STEEL .898 .895 .863 .527 .180 .829
(.027) (.028) (.036) (.102) (.137) (.044)
AUTOS .912 .724 .479 .733 .578 .809
(.024) (.067) (.109) (.065) (.094) (.049)
MEAT .592 .585 .618 .430 .706 .648
(.092) (.093) (.087) (.115) (.071) (.082)
PAPER .911 .771 .856 .360 .735 .672
(.024) (.057) (.038) (.123) (.065) (.078)
SHOES .714 .594 .503 .159 .094 .590
(.069) (.092) (.106) (.138) (.140) (.092)
WOOL .418 .295 .586 .252 .573 .294
(.127) (.141) (.101) (.144) (.123) (.141)
LEATH .620 .412 .416 .164 .368 .385
(.087) (.117) (.117) (.138) (.122) (.120)
LUMBR .881 .845 .658 .378 .489 .779
(.032) (.040) (.080) (.121) (.108) (.056)
ALLMFG .941 .839 .684 .378 .314 .693
(.016) (.042) (.075) (.121) (.128) (.073)
COAL .603 .710 .331 .371 .063 .676
(.090) (.070) (.126) (.122) (.141) (.077)
ELECT .290 .359 .734 .287 .203 .413
(.129) (.123) (.065) (.130) (.148) (.117)
CONST .568 .344 .384 .274 .507 .397
(.096) (.125) (.121) (.131) (.105) (.119)
Note:Bandwidthistwelvetoninety-six months. Standarderrorsaregiveninparentheses.599 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.8 Phase Leads of Growth Rates of Six Variables with Respect to
Growth Rate of Output, in Months
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
Prewar Data
STEEL -4.7 1.8 2.3 -5.3 -0.3 1.2
(1.11) (0.9) (0.7) (5.7) (6.9) (1.0)
AUTOS -0.5 10.4 -2.9 -10.6 -6.0 9.8
(1.0) (2.3) (1.7) (6.2) (5.8) (2.4)
MEAT -6.0 2.2 4.6 -22.2 -7.6 -5.1
(1.3) (1.9) (1.1) (2.5) (4.7) (5.3)
PAPER -7.3 2.4 2.3 -19.3 26.5 -0.5
(1.8) (0.9) (1.6) (2.1) (2.8) (1.1)
SHOES -6.3 -2.4 9.0 -11.5 9.0 -3.0
(1.6) (1.1) (1.9) (16.6) (11.3) (1.2)
WOOL -2.6 2.1 2.7 -15.8 24.7 -0.6
(0.6) (0.9) (1.3) (3.2) (3.4) (1.2)
LEATH -5.7 2.8 11.1 -14.6 26.5 -0.7
(1.4) (1.5) (4.5) (3.0) (1.9) (1.1)
LUMBR -3.8 2.0 11.2 -19.1 27.0 -0.7
(1.4) (1.3) (5.7) (4.3) (1.9) (2.0)
ALLMFG -3.9 2.3 9.3 -11.6 -19.5 -0.3
(0.6) (0.7) (2.4) (2.4) (2.1) (0.8)
Postwar Data
STEEL -2.8 1.1 2.2 3.1 9.3 1.6
(0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (2.0) (6.6) (0.8)
AUTOS -2.5 4.5 5.0 3.6 3.9 4.1
(0.5) (1.2) (2.2) (1.1) (1.7) (0.9)
MEAT -4.1 2.3 1.8 0.1 -1.6 1.3
(1.7) (1.7) (1.6) (2.6) (1.2) (1.4)
PAPER -4.4 2.1 3.9 7.2 10.0 3.5
(0.6) (1.0) (0.7) (3.2) (1.1) (1.3)
SHOES -5.9 1.6 3.8 -7.6 11.9 0.8
(1.2) (1.7) (2.1) (7.6) (12.9) (1.7)
WOOL -3.4 -1.0 1.5 4.9 24.3 0.5
(2.8) (4.1) (1.8) (4.9) (2.0) (4.1)
LEATH -2.3 3.5 1.7 -5.4 12.4 1.8
(1.5) (2.7) (2.7) (7.3) (3.1) (2.9)
LUMBR -3.9 2.0 6.4 -1.2 25.7 1.0
(0.7) (0.8) (1.4) (3.0) (2.2) (1.0)
ALLMFG -2.4 2.1 4.4 0.7 8.4 1.6
(0.5) (0.8) (1.3) (3.0) (3.7) (1.3)
COAL -5.1 -0.1 9.1 -10.4 -21.3 -1.7
(1.6) (1.2) (3.5) (3.0) (19.2) (1.3)
ELECT -16.0 -0.3 1.9 2.8 -5.4 1.3
(4.0) (3.2) (1.1) (4.1) (4.9) (2.7)
CONST -4.2 4.2 5.0 11.6 12.3 6.7
(1.8) (3.3) (2.9) (4.3) (2.0) (2.8)
Note: Bandwidthistwelvetoninety-sixmonths. Standarderrorsaregiveninparentheses.600 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. PoweU
we have done no explicitly structural test. Still, it is interesting that
this interpretation seems at least to be consistent with the facts for so
many disparate industries, and for both the prewar and postwar eras.
This stability across industries and sample periods is not shared by
the relationship of wages and output. There seems to be a definite
difference between the prewar and postwar behavior ofwages. Let us
concentrate on real, rather than product, wages. During the prewar
period, real wages lagged output significantly-not quite enough to be
called countercyclical, but still "half out of phase."3 (A well-known
example of this is the positive growth of real wages in 1931-32, even
as output and employment plunged.) In contrast, during the postwar
period real wages were nearly in phase (procyclical), even leading the
cycle in some industries.
Why did the cyclical behavior of real wages change between the
prewar and postwar periods? A satisfactory answer to this question
would require an explicit structural model, which we do not attempt
in this paper. However, we do present a simple heuristic example sug-
gesting that this change may be related to one of our earlier findings,
that layoffs have become relatively more important than work sharing
in the postwar period.
Suppose that, because offixed costs, workers can hold only onejob
at a time. (This example will generalize as long as an individual's work
effort is not infinitely divisible among employers.) Then the labor mar-
ket is cleared not by the hourly wage, but by the total utility available
to the worker in a job. Assume that workers get utility from total real
compensation Y and disutility from hours ofwork per week H. If, for
simplicity, the marginal utilities ofincome and leisure are taken to be
constant, then instantaneous utility at time t, VI' can be written as
(1)
where a is a parameter.
To retain their laborforces, firms must provide workers with (Yt , H t)
combinations such that workers' utility equals or exceeds iJ, the (ex-
ogenous) utility level obtainable elsewhere in the economy. Assuming
forpurposes ofthis example thatbusiness cycles are regular sine waves
and that iJis procyclical, we can write
(2) Or = iJo (1 + a sin t),
where U o is average obtainable utility and a is a positive parameter
measuring the cyclical sensitivity ofiJ.
3. This is reminiscent of Creamer's (1950) result for nominal wage rates. See section
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Firms' choices about which (Yt , H t) combinations to offer (from
among those combinations that satisfy the external utility constraint)
will arise from a maximization calculation that takes into account the
nature of the production function, the existence of specific human
capital or adjustment costs, and so forth. For this heuristic example
we do not explicitly specify the firm's maximization problem but simply
assume (realistically) that its outcome will imply a procyclical workweek:
(3) H t = Ho (1 + b sin t),
where Ho is the average workweek over the cycle and b measures the
workweek's cyclical sensitivity. Equation (3) is to be interpreted as a
reduced form; the parameter b may well depend on the other param-
eters in the problem.
The three equationsjustgiven, plus the assumption that real earnings
are just high enough to meet the external utility constraint, imply that
the cyclical behavior ofreal earnings per worker is
(4) Yt = (ilo + uHo) + (a + ub) sin t.
Average earnings Yo equal Uo + uHo.
In this example, the measured "real wage" Wt is just Y/Ht • Under
what conditions will the measured wage be procyclical (i.e., have a
positive sensitivity to the exogenous cycle)? It is easy to show that the
necessary and sufficient condition for real wage procyclicality is
(5) a > b.
That is, wages are procyclical if reservation utility has a greater sen-
sitivity to the cycle than do hours of work.
It is difficult to say what has happened over time to the cyclical
sensitivity ofreservation utility; perhaps reservation utility has become
less cyclical in the postwarperiod, which would work against the pres-
ent argument. However, in section 10.4 we introduced evidence that
b, the cyclical sensitivity of hours, has fallen in the postwar era. The
example shows that, everything else being equal, reduced cyclical sen-
sitivity of hours tends to be associated with greater observed procy-
clicality in real wages. Thus, two of the novel findings ofthis paper-
that hours have become less procyclical and that real wages more
procyclical in the postwar period-may be related.
An important question is whetherthe cyclical relationships described
in tables 10.7 and 10.8 are the same in long and short business cycles.
Closely related is whether it is useful to study "reference cycles."
Burns and Mitchell frequently measured timing relationships in terms
of "stages" of a standard "reference cycle" instead of in calendar
times. For this to be worthwhile, it must be the case that cyclical lead/602 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. Powell
lag relationships are roughly constant fractions of the cycle length
rather than constant when measured in calendar time; that is to say,
phase angles must be constant across business cycle frequencies.
Some insight on this question is provided by table 10.9. That table
gives the estimates of the phase leads of the six variables for the de-
seasonalized high-frequency band (two to twelve months); for short
cycles (one to two years); and for long cycles (two to eight years). (The
business cycle band was broken up in that particularway because there
are approximately as many frequencies with periods between twelve
and twenty-four months as there are with periods between twenty-four
and ninety-six months.) Also reported for each variable are the results
of a statistical test for constancy of phase angles between short and
long business cycles. Inspection oftable 10.9 suggests two observations.
First, while notmuch systematicemergesin the high-frequency band,
the qualitative pattern of leads and lags is the same in the short and
long business cycles ranges (the bandc rows in the table). Forexample,
productivity still leads the cycle, employment still lags.
Second, there appears to be a bitofsupportforthe''referencecycle"
construction(and, byimplication, for the "timedeformation" approach
tocycles recently suggested by Stock 1983). The hypothesis ofconstant
phase angles between short and long business cycles, which is implied
by the reference cycle approach, is not usually rejected by the data.
(Exceptions are the prewarmeat-packing industry and, to some extent,
aggregate manufacturing in both the prewar and postwar periods.) Thus,
assuming that leads and lags are proportional to cycle length does not
seem unreasonable. On the other hand, it should be noted that this
evidence in favor of reference cycles may possibly be spurious: as an
example in Hause (1971) shows, two variables with a fixed distributed
lag relationship in the time domain may also exhibita phaserelationship
that is roughly proportional to the period ofthe cycle.
The observations we have made so far apply to more or less all the
industries in the sample, with a few distinctions drawn between the
patterns visible in the prewar period and those in the postwar era. We
had hoped to be able to make more cross-sectional distinctions (e.g.,
like the finding ofNadiri and Rosen 1973 that input responses are much
more rapid in durable goods industries). Unfortunately, much less cross-
sectional variation than we expected was evident when we grouped
the industries in the obvious ways.
To seeifthe industries mightbegroupedbythe natureoftheircyclical
behavior, we estimated the coherences and phases between industry
outputs and the aggregate index ofoutput, for the prewar and postwar
periods separately. These are presented in table 10.10. An odd result
is that almost all the phase leads are positive; this may be due to the
inclusion of input-based measures of output in the aggregate index.603 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.9 Phase Leads of Growth Rates of Six Variables with Respect to
Growth Rate of Output, in Months
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
Prewar Data
(a) -0.4 0.0 0.2 -1.9 2.5 -0.1
STEEL (b) -1.6 0.6 0.8 2.2 2.4 0.8
(c) -5.0 2.1 2.5 - 13.8*** -13.5*** -0.4
(a) 0.3 0.5 -0.2 -1.4 -1.2 0.4
AUTOS (b) -0.3 4.1 -0.9 -2.2 -1.2 4.0
(c) 0.1 6.6 -3.6 -15.3 -9.4 5.0*
(a) -1.0 -0.1 0.2 -2.0 -1.2 -0.2
MEAT (b) -2.2 0.6 1.1 -8.2 -5.5 0.2
(c) -5.8 23.9*** 10.4*** -16.1 0.3*** -18.9***
(a) -1.4 -0.6 0.3 -3.0 -2.4 -0.9
PAPER (b) -3.1 0.7 0.8 -7.1 -8.9 0.1
(c) -4.5 3.4 2.7 -18.1 27.8 -2.7
(a) -0.3 -0.1 0.1 2.8 2.6 0.1
SHOES (b) -1.9 -0.9 3.0 -7.4 4.4 -1.1
(c) -8.6 -1.1 9.8 -5.0 0.6 -2.3
(a) -0.6 -0.1 0.4 -2.6 -3.4 -0.3
WOOL (b) -0.6 0.6 0.6 -5.3 -8.9 0.2
(c) -4.4 2.9 5.3 -17.5 25.6 -3.5
(a) 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.9 -3.3 0.2
LEATH (b) -2.4 0.8 3.5 -4.9 8.8 0.1
(c) -3.2 4.0 18.7 -15.9 29.5 -4.0
(a) -0.4 0.6 -0.1 -2.6 -3.0 0.4
LUMBR (b) -1.8 0.4 4.6 -7.4 -8.8 -0.5
(c) -1.3*** 5.7 -0.9* -5.7 28.8 0.8
(a) -0.5 -0.1 0.6 3.4 -3.2 -0.1
ALL MFG (b) -1.7 0.6 2.3 -3.9 -7.2 0.0
(c) -3.3* 3.4 19.9*** -12.8 -20.0 -0.7
Postwar Data
(a) -0.4 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.1
STEEL (b) -0.9 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.3
(c) -3.3 2.9*** 4.4* 4.7 17.6 3.4
(a) -0.2 -0.1 1.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
AUTOS (b) -0.8 1.5 1.6 1.2 2.0 1.4
(c) -2.7 4.6 6.1 3.9 -0.7* 4.3
(a) -1.3 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -0.1
MEAT (b) -1.3 0.9 0.5 1.0 -0.2 0.9
(c) -4.9 1.9 2.4 -5.6* -2.4 -1.5
(a) 0.4 -0.6 0.0 2.7 -2.0 -0.4
PAPER (b) -1.2 0.3 1.0 -2.8 3.1 0.1
(c) -5.5 3.6 5.8* 8.7 12.0 5.8*
(a) 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.0 1.2 0.5
SHOES (b) -1.9 0.9 0.6 -3.5 5.3 0.5
(c) -6.7 0.8 8.3 -5.6 10.9 0.1604 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
Table 10.9 (continued)
Industry EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
(a) 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 2.5 0.1
WOOL (b) -1.9 -1.9 0.5 1.0 -5.2 0.5
(c) -2.2 3.7 0.8 7.1 25.2** 4.6
(a) 0.7 0.7 -0.1 0.7 1.8 0.7
LEATH (b) -0.4 1.5 -0.1 -3.3 -8.5 0.7
(c) -3.2 3.0 4.2 -2.6 13.3 1.7
(a) -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2 0.3
LUMBR (b) -1.4 0.7 1.3 -2.6 -7.7 0.2
(c) -6.2 0.8 18.7*** -8.5 29.1 0.2
(a) -0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.1
ALL MFG (b) -0.7 0.0 1.0 -1.8 2.8 -0.7
(c) -2.9 4.7*** 9.5** 5.7** 9.3 9.5**
(a) -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -2.7 -1.6 -0.2
COAL (b) -1.1 -0.3 0.7 -3.7 -3.2 -1.1
(c) -6.2 0.8 18.7*** -8.5 29.0 0.2
(a) 2.1 0.7 -0.1 -2.2 0.6 0.3
ELECT (b) -5.7 1.1 0.3 -3.3 -4.4 -0.8
(c) -16.5 -9.0* 3.1 8.5*** -0.1 5.2
(a) 0.0 0.2 0.0 -3.4 -3.1 0.2
CONST (b) -0.8 1.6 0.6 7.0 5.6 3.2
(c) -6.7 1.5 8.5 4.9*** 10.3** 4.0
Note: Asterisks denote significance of t-tests of difference of phase angles between
frequency bands (b) and (c), at marginal significance levels of .10 (*), .05 (**), and .01
(***).
(a) Bandwidth: two to twelve months.
(b) Bandwidth: twelve to twenty-four months.
(c) Bandwidth: twenty four to ninety-six months.
The coherence estimates suggest that cyclical influences became rel-
atively less important for the industries in the postwar period. There
is also a tendency in the postwar sample for durable goods industries
to exhibit a relatively higher coherence with the cycle than nondurable
goods industries. However, except for meat-packing, there is surpris-
ingly little evidence ofthis pattern in the prewar period. Overall, cross-
sectional differences still seem less significant than cross-sectional
similarities.
10.6 Analysis in the Time Domain
To complement the frequency domain analysis of the data, we em-
ployed time domain methods, primarily vectorautoregressions (VARs).
Separate VARs, using twelve monthly lags of four variables (output,
hours, employment, and real wages), were estimated for each of the605 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.10 Coherences and Phase Leads of Growth Rates of Output in Each
Industry with Respect to Growth Rate of "All Manufacturing"
Output
Industry Period Coherence (SE) Phase Lead (SE)
STEEL 1923-39 94.7 (2.0) 1.3 (0.6)
1954-82 64.6 (8.2) 0.2 (1.4)
AUTOS 1923-39 78.0 (7.4) -4.1 (1.3)
1954-82 78.6 (5.4) 0.2 0.0)
MEAT 1923-39 19.5 08.2) 1.2 (8.2)
1954-82 26.2 (13.2) 4.8 (4.5)
PAPER 1923-39 86.7 (4.7) 2.3 (0.9)
1954-82 79.7 (5.2) 1.2 (0.9)
SHOES 1923-39 73.9 (8.6) 6.7 (1.5)
1954-82 46.4 (11.1) 4.9(2.3)
WOOL 1923-39 80.1 (6.8) 3.5 (1.2)
1954-82 31.9 03.9) 1.4 (3.9)
LEATH 1923-39 75.0 (8.3) 0.6 0.4)
1954-82 38.8 (12.0) 3.7 (2.9)
LUMBR 1923-39 88.0 (4.3) 1.0 (0.9)
1954-82 73.9 (6.4) 5.3 (1.1)
COAL 1954-82 28.4 (13.0) -5.4 (4.1)
ELECT 1954-82 44.7 (11.3) - 2.1 (2.4)
CONST 1954-82 57.4 (9.5) 6.3 (1.7)
Note: Bandwidth is twelve to ninety-six months.
prewar and postwar industries and for the aggregates. The data were
the same centeredand seasonalized log differences described in section
10.5. As in Sims (1980), the estimated VARs were used to do three
things. First, we looked at the statistical significance ofblocks ofcoef-
ficients in order to search for patterns of causality (in the Granger
sense). Second, we calculated the percentages of the forecast errors
attributable to (triangularized) innovations in the right-hand-side vari-
ables, for four forecast horizons. Finally, the implied impulse/response
diagrams were examined for systematic timing relationships among the
variables. We briefly discuss each of these exercises.
Table 10.11 summarizes the results ofthe Granger-causality F-tests.
There is one matrix for each dependent variable. In each matrix, the
rows designate the industry to which the VAR applies, the columns
give the blockofindependent variables being tested. One, two, orthree
asterisks in a given cell of a matrix implies that the twelve monthly
lags ofthe independent variable jointly "explain" the dependent vari-
able (for the given industry and period) at the .10, .05, or .01 level of
significance. No asterisks in a cell implies that the joint contribution
of all lags of the given regressor is not significant at the .10 level.606 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
Table 10.11 VARF-Tests
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables Industry IP HRS EMP WR
Prewar Data
IP







LUMBR *** *** ***
ALLMFG ***
HRS
STEEL *** *** *** ***
AUTOS ***
MEAT ** * *
PAPER *** *
SHOES *** *** ***
WOOL *** ** ***
LEATH *** *** ***
LUMBR ** ***
ALLMFG *** * ***
EMP
STEEL *
AUTOS *** *** ** *
MEAT ** **
PAPER ** **



















MEAT *** ** *
PAPER *** ** ***
SHOES *** *** **
WOOL *** ***
LEATH *** **
LUMBR *** *** ***607 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.11 (continued)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables Industry IP HRS EMP WR





STEEL ** *** **
AUTOS ***
MEAT ** *** **
PAPER *** *** *
SHOES *** *** ***
WOOL * *** *** ***
LEATH *** **
LUMBR ***
ALLMFG *** *** **





AUTOS *** ** ***
MEAT *** **
PAPER *** *** ***
SHOES ** *** ***
WOOL *** *** *** ***
LEATH *** ***
LUMBR *** *** **















ELECT ** *** ***
CONST ***
Note: F-tests whose outcomes are reported are tests ofthejoint significance ofall twelve
lags of the independent variable in the explanation of the dependent variable. (All vari-
ables are in growth rates.)
*F-test significant at .10 level.
**F-test significant at .05 level.
***F-test significant at .01 level.608 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. PoweU
Table 10.11 suggests that, for all industries taken together:
1. Output growth tends to be relatively exogenous (in the Granger
sense), at least in comparison with the growth rates of employment
and hours. (Thus hours may be a "leading indicator" without having
incremental predictive value for output. See Neftci 1979.) Output seemed
to be much more "persistent" in the postwar period, in the sense that
lagged growth rates ofoutput became much stronger predictors ofthe
current growth rate.
2. Hours and employment are rarely found to be Grangerexogenous;
they respond both to each other and to output. The two variables are
also found to be persistent, in the sensejustdefined, in both the prewar
and postwar samples. The persistence of employment will be an ap-
pealing finding for supporters of the view that there are "adjustment
costs" to changing employment. Are there also adjustment costs to
changing hours of work? The data seem consistent with this.
3. The real wage seems to vary nearly independently of the three
other variables, neither consistently predicting nor being predictable
by them. A remarkably strong finding about the real wage is that, like
output, its persistence significantly increased between the prewar and
postwar periods.
The results of the forecast error decomposition exercise are given
in Table 10.12. To save space, we report results for three industries
only: iron and steel (a durable goods industry), paper and pulp (non-
durables), and leather tanning and finishing (semidurables). Results for
the manufacturing aggregates are also reported. The prewar and post-
war forecast error decompositions are placed side by side in the table,
for easier comparison. Also note that, since the growth in productivity
is just a linear combination of the growth in output, hours, and em-
ployment (all of which were included in the VARs), it is possible to
report decompositions for this variable as well.
As the reader familiar with these methods is aware, the attribution
offorecast errorat different horizons to the (triangularized) innovations
in the regressors is not invariant to the ordering of the variables. The
ordering used here (and for the construction of the impulse/response
diagrams below) is as follows: (log differences of) output, hours, em-
ployment, real wages. Given that the dataare monthly and thatforecast
horizons up to forty-eight months are studied, the choice of ordering
is not likely to be crucial to the results.
The pattern ofrelationships suggested by table 10.12 is, perhaps not
surprisingly, very similar to that revealed by the F-tests reported in
table 10.11. Note, for example, that the relatively exogenous output
variable (IP) is shown in table 10.12 to be largely "self-caused," even
at the four-year forecast horizon. (This tendency seems to be even611 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
greater in the postwar period than in the prewar.) Hours and ~mploy­
ment are fairly sensitive to output innovations except, for some reason,
in the postwar leather industry. The "persistence" of both hours and
employment is apparent; this persistence increases markedly for hours
in the postwar era. The productivity variable is largely driven by in-
novations in output, especially in the postwar period, although pro-
ductivity's othercomponents (employment and hours) also playarole.
Again, a most striking finding is the relationship (or lack of a rela-
tionship) between real wages and the other variables. Innovations in
the real wage appear to have virtually no predictive power for output,
employment, and weekly hours; and in the other direction, no variable
except the real wage itselfis ofmuch use in forecasting the real wage.
This essential independence of the real wage and the other variables
is more pronounced in the postwar period.
The final exercise in the time domain was the use of the estimated
VARs to generate impulse/response (IR) diagrams. These diagrams show
the movement over time ofeach variable in the VAR in response to a
(triangularized) innovation to one of the regressors. (The response of
productivity to innovations in the other variables was also analyzed.)
The ordering of the variables was the same as in the forecast error
decompositions above. Since the data are in log differences, we printed
out cumulative response diagrams; this allowed us to interpret the
patterns in terms oflog levels. These diagrams were useful for gaining
a qualitative appreciation of "typical" short-run patterns in the data.
The number ofindustries, variables, and sample periods meant that
there were potentially hundreds of IR diagrams to study. We chose to
look carefully only at the three representative industries (iron and steel,
paper, leather); we also looked closely at construction. The reader will
be burdened with only a few sample IR diagrams (see figs. 10.1 and
10.2). These show the forty-eight month response pattern of (the log
levels of) output, hours, employment, real wages, and productivity to
a one standard deviation innovation in output growth in the iron and
steel industry. Figure 10.1 a-d cover the prewar period; figure 10.2 a-
d cover the postwar period. The path of output is included in each
diagram, for reference.
From our examination ofall the IR diagrams, we drew the following
conclusions:
1. Generally, the IRs reinforce the characterization of the cycle ob-
tained in the frequency domain. Forexample, the conclusion ofsection
10.5 that productivity is highly coherent with output and that it tends
to lead the cycle by a few months emerges distinctly from the IR
diagrams; this is true no matter which disturbance term provides the







































































































































































































































































































































.614 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. Powell
for hours and employmentfound byfrequency domain techniques recur
almost exactly in the IRs. Figures 10.la, b, d and 10.2a, b, d are here
perfectly representative.
2. As the frequency domain analysis was less clearabout the cyclical
characteristics of the real wage, so it is the case in the time domain.
The pictures show a real wage behavior that is not very stable across
industries and that is also sensitive to the source of the initial shock,
especially in the prewar sample. However, as in section 10.4, there
still appear to be noticeable differences between prewar and postwar
wage movements. (See figs. 10.le and 10.2e.) During the postwar pe-
riod, in the cases when there is a visible relationship between output
and wages, the IRs show the real wage to be a roughly coincident,
procyclical variable. In the prewar data, the real wage is usually "half
out of phase," either lagging (the typical response to output shocks;
see fig. 10.le) or leading (when there is an employment shock). There
is also an interesting contrast between the prewar and postwar periods
with regard to the effect of a wage shock on the rest ofthe system: a
prewarwage shock tends to result in declining outputand employment,
whereas a wage shock in the postwar sample typically has just the
opposite effect.
3. Finally, the diagrams show a postwardecline in cyclical variability
(given a "typical" shock), which is consistent with several findings
already discussed. Output and real wages in particular (reflecting their
increased "persistence"?) are much less prone to gyrations in the post-
war sample.
10.7 Four Major Recessions
The analysis so far has been "democratic" in its use of the data,
allowing every sample observation equal weight in the calculations.
This is consistent with the view that business cycles are realizations
of stationary stochastic processes. An alternative view is that serious
recessions or depressions are "special" occurrences, governed by dif-
ferent laws ofprobability than the "normal" parts ofthe sample. (This
idea is investigated more formally by the Blanchard/Watson paper in
this volume.) In the spirit of this alternative view, this section looks
briefly at the behavior of labor market variables during four major
downturns-two prewar and two postwar.
The four downturns studied are 1929:3 to 1933:1, 1937:2 to 1938:2,
1973:4 to 1975:1, and 1981:3 to 1982:4. Note that, except for the first,
the recessions are ofcomparable length. (The peakand trough quarters
are from the official NBER chronology.) For each of the four down-
turns, table 10.13 gives (for each of the seven labor market variables
studied) the ratio of the average value of the level of the variable in615 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table 10.13 Trough-to-Peak Ratios of Seven Variables for Four Selected
Recessions
Industry Cycle IP EMP HRS PROD WR WP EARN
STEEL I .17 .50 .56 .62 .91 .84 .50
II .36 .72 .65 .77 .95 .92 .62
III .87 .96 .95 .95 1.00 .81 .95
IV .57 .68 .96 .87 .99 1.05 .94
AUTOS I .18 .40 .76 .58 .99 .88 .75
II .36 .49 .85 .86 1.02 .90 .87
III .60 .74 .93 .88 .95 .92 .88
IV .96 .87 1.01 1.10 .97 .97 .97
MEAT I .91 .77 .95 1.25 .95 1.50 .90
II 1.07 .93 1.03 1.12 .99 1.12 1.02
III .97 .98 .99 1.00 1.01 1.17 1.00
IV .90 .96 1.00 .94 .94 .94 .94
PAPER I .59 .74 .79 1.01 .99 .87 .79
II .71 .87 .86 .95 1.06 1.13 .91
III .74 .88 .95 .89 .96 .82 .91
IV .98 .95 .99 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.01
SHOES I .79 .89 .92 .96 .99 .95 .91
II .82 .93 .73 1.20 1.00 1.02 .73
III .81 .87 .91 1.03 .95 .98 .86
IV .87 .91 .98 .97 1.00 1.01 .98
WOOL I .62 .73 .88 .95 .94 1.23 .83
II .44 .68 .80 .80 1.01 1.21 .81
III .47 .57 .71 1.16 .91 1.23 .65
IV .77 .77 .82 1.22 .99 NA .82
LEATH I .76 .80 .91 1.04 .98 1.43 .89
II .71 .79 .85 1.06 1.03 1.23 .87
III 1.03 .99 .99 1.06 .95 1.24 .94
IV .88 .90 1.01 .97 1.02 1.07 1.03
LUMBR I .32 .42 .74 1.04 .92 1.13 .68
II .67 .86 .87 .89 1.02 1.22 .88
III .75 .78 .94 1.01 .96 1.21 .91
IV 1.10 .99 1.02 1.09 1.01 1.06 1.02
ALLMFG I .50 .72 .79 .89 .96 1.01 .76
II .62 .73 .81 1.05 .97 1.04 .78
III .81 .88 .96 .96 .97 .88 .93
IV .90 .90 .99 1.01 .99 1.02 .98
COAL III 1.05 1.20 1.01 .87 .96 .68 .97
IV .83 .84 .91 1.09 1.02 1.02 .93
ELECT III .96 .98 .97 1.00 .96 .80 .94
IV .93 1.00 1.01 .93 1.02 1.00 1.02
CONST III .78 .87 .98 .92 .94 .89 .92
IV .99 .93 .98 1.09 1.00 1.04 .98
Note: The variables from which the ratios are formed are detrended, deseasonalized,
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the trough quarter to its average value in the preceding peak quarter.
(The data are detrended and deseasonalized.) The purpose ofthis is to
get a rough measure of the behavior of these variables in individual
major recessions. (Alternatives would have been to construct multi-
stage Bums/Mitchell "reference cycles" or to look at all quarters of
the downturns. We experimented with both of these but did not find
them much more informative.)
A preliminary point that should be made is that the designated peaks
and troughs are based on aggregate economic variation, which may not
coincide exactly with the industry-level cycles. Nevertheless, there is
obviously a strong correlation between aggregate and industry output:
in table 10.13 the trough-to-peak ratio for (detrended) production ex-
ceeds one only four times in thirty-eight cases.
The trough-to-peak ratios for most ofthe variables displayed in table
10.13 do not seem too far out of line with our findings of previous
sections. Employment and hours display their strong procyclicality
throughout. As in section 10.4, we see again here that postwar em-
ployers seemed to rely more on layoffs than on short workweeks as
the means of reducing labor input in the trough, whereas prewar em-
ployers relied relatively more heavily on part-time work. Real wages
show little systematic peak-to-trough change, which is indicative ofthe
low coherence ofreal wages and output. Product wages are more vari-
able than real wages; they also show some tendency to countercycli-
cality. Weekly real earnings, as would be predicted, are clearly
procyclical.
A variable that is somewhat puzzling is productivity. The standard
finding that productivity is procyclical implies that its trough-to-peak
ratio should be less than one. This ratio is actually below one in only
about half of the thirty-four cases in which output declines between
peak and trough. Productivity is most procyclical in the heavy durable
goods industries (iron and steel, automobiles); in the other industries
productivity is more likely to rise than fall, peak to trough.
A partial explanation of these results may follow from our earlier
finding that productivity, though essentially procyclical, may lead the
cycle by a number of months. Thus productivity at the output peak
has already fallen from its highest level, while at the output trough it
has already begunto recover. (A similarobservationis made by Gordon
1980.) The recovery of productivity in the trough may also be partic-
ularly strong in very deep recession, in which financial pressure on
firms increases the costs of hoarding labor or permitting inefficient
production. These considerations serve at least to reduce this new
productivity puzzle, though they probably do not eliminate it.
Putting aside the productivity question, table 10.13 does suggest that
there are qualitative similarities between major recessions and less617 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
dramatic economic fluctuations. This should be encouraging to fore-
casters and policymakers, whose tasks would be impossible if every
severe fluctuation were essentially a unique event.
10.8 Conclusion
This exercise in "measurement without theory" has supported some
existing perceptions about the cyclical behavior of labor markets and
has uncovered a few additional facts. To summarize the most important
findings:
1. Procyclicallabor productivity (SRIRL) appears to be present in
every industry, in both the prewar and postwar periods. (This paper is
thefirst to documentSRIRLfor the pre-1932 period, as far as we know.)
However, in confirming this standard empirical result, we have found
two qualifications. First, productivity is a leading, rather than coinci-
dent, variable. Second, SRIRL may be less pronounced in major
recessions.
2. Weekly hours and employment are strongly procyclical. Hours
lead output, whereas employment lags. Our evidence that employment
is lagging rather than coincident is somewhat novel; otherwise these
observations replicate previous results.
3. A new finding is that there has been an increased reliance in the
postwar period on layoffs, rather than short workweeks, as a means
of reducing labor input.
4. The relationship ofthe real wage to other variables over the busi-
ness cycle is weak, and it has been weaker in the postwar period. On
the question whether any cyclical sensitivity ofthe real wage exists at
all, the results from the frequency domain analysis are much more
affirmative than those for the time domain. The difference between the
two approaches probably arises because the frequency domain analysis
blocks out some high-frequency interference that the time domain anal-
ysis does not; this permits the frequency domain approach to recover
a relationship at business cycle frequencies that is less apparent in the
time domain. The noisiness of the wage/employment relationship in
the time domain may explain the inability ofGeary and Kennan (1982)
to reject the hypothesis that these two series are independent.
5. To the extent that the real wage is related to the cycle, there seems
to be a definite difference between its prewar and its postwarbehavior.
The real wage was procyclical (essentially coincident) in the postwar
period but "half out of phase" (usually lagging) in the prewar. This
difference has notbeennoticedbeforefor real wages, although Creamer
(1950) found that nominal wages lagged the cycle in the early prewar
period.618 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
6. The relationship of product wages to the cycle is, if anything,
weaker and more erratic than that ofreal wages. Real weekly earnings
are strongly procyclical in both major samples.
7. Cyclical variation is a relatively small part of the total variation
of the labor market variables. (A similar finding is in Bernanke 1983.)
The postwar data exhibit more stability (i.e., less total variance and
less business cycle variance). They also are more serially persistent
than the data from the earlier period, which may be interpreted either
as being consistent with Sach's (1980) finding of greater rigidity or as
simply reflecting a more stable economy.
We hope that this and similar analyses will lead to a better under-
standing of the cyclical behavior of labor markets. However, we em-
phasize once again that this research is intended to be a complement
to, not a substitute for, structural modeling of these phenomena.
Appendix
Sources
The sources of the prewar industry data used in this study are as
follows:
1. Earnings, hours, and employment data are from Beney (1936) and
Sayre (1940). These data are the result ofan extensive monthly survey
conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB) from
1920 until 1947.
All the industries in the sample paid at least part oftheir work force
by piece rates (see Monthly Labor Review 41 [September 1935]:697-
700). No correction was made for this.
2. Industrial production data are from the Federal Reserve Board.
See "New Federal Reserve Index of Industrial Production," Federal
Reserve Bulletin 26 (August 1940):753-69, 825-74.
3. Wholesale price indexes are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). See the following publications ofthe United States Department
of Labor: Handbook ofLabor Statistics (1931 ed., bulletin 541; 1936
ed., bulletin 616; 1941 ed., bulletin 694) and Wholesale Prices 1913 to
1927 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929, bulletin
473). For the automobile industry we merged two BLS series ofmotor
vehicle prices. Neither series covered 1935; the price series on all metal
products was used to interpolate the automobiles price series for that
year.
4. The consumer price series is from Sayre (1948).619 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
All basic data were seasonally unadjusted. The span of the prewar
sample is January 1923 to December 1939. Although some of the data
exist before 1923, there are two major problems with extending the
samplefurther back: someofthe industrialproductiondataare missing,
and there is a six-monthgap in the NICB survey in 1923. The December
1939 stop date was chosen to avoid considering the many special fea-
tures of the wartime economy.
The sources of the postwar industry data are as follo\vs:
1. Earnings, hours, and employment data are from Employment and
Earnings, United States (Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2. Industrial production indexes for industries 1-10 are from the
Federal Reserve Board (see Board ofGovernors, Federal Reserve Board,
Industrial Production, 1976. Updates are from the Federal Reserve
Bulletin, and some unpublished series were obtained directly from the
board.) The output index for construction was obtained by dividing the
value ofnew construction (as reported by the Survey ofCurrent Busi-
ness [SCB]) by the Department of Commerce construction cost index
(also available in the SCB).
3. Wholesale prices are again from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
See Wholesale Prices and Price Indexes, 1963 (BLS bulletin 1513),
Producer Price Indexes, and the Monthly Labor Review.
4. The consumer price series used to calculate real wages is the
Department of Labor's consumer price index (all items, wage earners
and clerical workers, revised).
Again, the basic data are seasonally unadjusted. The span of the
postwar sample is 1954-82, except for the wool textile industry, where
the data begin in January 1958. Adequate data on output prices (and
therefore on product wages) are missing for wool textiles after 1975
and for electric services before 1958.
The total manufacturing series were as follows:
1. For the prewar period, output was measured by the industrial
production index for manufacturing. Employment, hours, and earnings
data come from the National Industrial Conference Board, as reported
in Beney(1936) andSayre(1940). TheNICB series are basedontwenty-
five major manufacturing industries; the coverage is similar but not
identical to that ofthe industrial production index. The manufacturing
outputprice, usedonlyin the constructionoftheproductwage variable,
is the BLS wholesale price index for nonagricultural, nonfuel goods.
Again the coverage is similar but not identical to that ofthe IP index.
2. For the postwar period, again the IP index for manufacturing is
used to measure output. Employment, hours, and earnings data are for
manufacturing production workers; the output price is the wholesale
price index for total manufacturers. Those data are from Business Sta-620 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
tistics and the Survey ofCurrent Business and, as far as we can tell,
are mutually consistent.
Stationarity
The log-differenced data series appeared in general to be stationary.
We arrived at this conclusion by studying the autocorrelations and par-
tial autocorrelations of the log-differenced data and by testing for the
presence oftrend shifts and higher-order trend terms in the log levels.
Rejectionsofstationaritywere sufficientlyinfrequentandweakthat,for
the sake ofuniform treatment ofthe data, we decided to ignore them.
Reduction of High-Frequency Noise
The spectra of most of the series exhibited considerable power in
the higher frequencies; high-frequency noise (primarily seasonality)
may interfere with the analysis ofthe dataat business cyle frequencies.
To reduce this noise, we regressed each log-differenced series against
constant, seasonal dummies and (where applicable) dummy variables
for strike periods. (There was no pooling of regressions across indus-
tries or between the two major sample periods. There also appeared
to be no need to allow for shifts of the regression coefficients within
subsamples.) The residuals from these regressions, "cleaned" ofmuch
of the very high- and low-frequency noise of the original series, were
treated as the basic data in the frequency and time domain analyses.
Details of Frequency Domain Calculations
The entries oftables 10.7 through 10.10 were constructed by simple
averaging of the finite Fourier transforms, evaluated at evenly spaced
intervals on (0,1T), for each data series. Since the prewar and postwar
sample sizes differed, the frequencies corresponding to the "business
cycle" varied as well; thus each calculation involved averages ofabout
7% (that is, 1/12-1/96) of the number of periodogram ordinates cal-
culated for each variable.
Table 10.6 gives square roots ofthe cumulatedperiodogramordinates
(between twelve and ninety-six months) for each variable. These cal-
culations (and those in the remaining tables) will not be affected by the
seasonal or strike adjustments made for the log-differenced data.
Standard errors for the sample coherencepand phasee betweeneach
pair ofvariables were computed using the following formulas, adapted
from Hannan (1970, chap. 7):
[SE(p)]2 = v-l/2(1 - (2), and
[SE(ew = V- 1I2C;/2) 112,621 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
where v is twice the number ofperiodogram ordinates in the 12-96 month
range. Since these expressions are derived from the asymptotic behav-
ior of finite Fourier transforms, the resulting confidence intervals are
only approximate andwill bepoorly behavedforpnearzeroorone; still,
the standard errors are useful guides to the precision ofthe estimates.
The estimated phase leads of tables 10.8 through 10.10 were ex-
pressed in months by dividing the estimated phase angle 6 (and its
standard error) by the frequency corresponding to the period in the
centerofthe bandwidth considered. That is, the phase leads calculated
for the 12-96, 2-12, 12-24, and 24-96 month bandwidths correspond
to cycles with period lengths 54, 7, 18, and 60 months, respectively.
These period lengths are uniformly higher than the period lengths cor-
responding to the average frequency in the bandwidth (which is, for
example, about 2/(1/12 + 1/96) = 21.33 months for the 12-96 month
bandwidth). Since the coherences and phase angles are implicitly as-
sumed to be constant within each frequency band, the phase lead for
any frequency in the interval can be obtained by rescaling; that is, to
obtain a phase lead for a "typical" 20 month cycle, the reported phase
lead (and its standard error) for the 12-24month bandwidth can simply
be multiplied by 20/18. The tests of equality of phase angles in table
10.9 do not use the "scaled" phase leads above; rather, t-statistics for
the difference inphaseangles are constructeddirectlyfrom the standard
error formulas reported above (and use the large-sample independence
of the phase estimates for the prewar and postwar periods).
All calculations were carried out using the RATS statistical package
(see Doan and Litterman 1981). Other, more theoretical references to
frequency domain methods are the texts by Hannan (1970) and An-
derson (1971).
Comment Martin N. Baily
This was a very valuable paper, and I wish there were more like it. It
simply presents the data, without imposing much structure or bringing
in a lot ofpriorjudgments. Ofcourse from a discussant's point ofview
it is nice ifauthors go way out on a limb, for then you can knock them
off. These authors kept fairly close to what they were observing, so
that I have no major criticisms to make.
They start with a review ofthe literature. It would have been worth-
while in this review to distinguish overhead labor from labor hoarding.
Martin N. Baily is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.622 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
They mention only labor hoarding, although they do cite the article by
Solow that develops the overhead labor hypothesis. The difference
between the two in principle is that with labor hoarding there are
workers who could be dispensed with-the same amount of output
could be produced with fewer workers. With overhead labor there is
a nonconvexity ofthe production set-in the short run the number of
security guards looking after the plant cannot be reduced. The two are
also different in practice. Since estimates offirm-specific human capital
suggest that it is small, this means that labor hoarding is a short-run
phenomenon, whereas overhead labor is likely to be longer term. The
relative importance of the two can be judged from the timing of the
short-run increasing returns observed in the data.
The main part of the paper is an analysis of data on output, em-
ployment, weekly hours, and wages, and the authors have done a fine
job of data collection. They distinguish the real wage, defined as the
money wage divided by the CPI, from the product wage, defined as
the money wage divided by the wholesale price index for the particular
industry they are looking at. They emphasize that there are aggregation
biases and that we should look at individual industries. They have data
for eight individual manufacturing industries and three nonmanufac-
turing industries, and they do throw in the manufacturing aggregate so
that we can see what that looks like too. Since their output numbers
are based on Federal Reserve Board indexes, the argument against
using aggregate data is very strong, for the aggregate series is heavily
contaminatedwith laborinputdata. However, therearepitfallsinavoid-
ing the aggregate numbers that I will mention at the end. They say they
cannotuse high-tech industries becauseofthe continuity problem. That
seems sensible, though I think it might have introduced some bias. It
is in the nature of the economy that old industries die and new ones
corne on line, and things that might hold true for a set of industries
thathave beenaroundforalong time might notbe truefor newindustries.
The first result they get from the raw datais that productivity growth
was surprisingly strong in 1923-39 relative to 1954-82. That is con-
sistent with my own view that the Great Depression did not push down
the underlying productivity trend. It argues against a view that I en-
counter quite often, that slack demand since 1973 has been a major
influence on the recent productivity slowdown. This first result con-
trasts with their second finding, that there is a very high correlation
between labor productivity and output in the short run. As they indi-
cate, this may be due to errors in the data. Correlating output divided
by hours with output is a dangerous exercise. I would have left out
some of those correlations. The output data are obtained from ship-
ments adjusted by an estimate of the change in inventories. The in-
ventory numbers are very suspect in the short run, so that the output
numbers are somewhat suspect also.623 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Their next findings are that real wage growth was larger in 1923-39
than in the postwar period for all industries, but that declining hours
of work in 1923-39 kept down real weekly earnings. They also find
that the variances are very large in the output and employment num-
bers. They might have made more ofthis; it is a rather important fact.
They observe extremely large variability ofmonthly employment, vari-
ability that is not related to aggregate conditions. Within each industry
there is a lot of month-to-month variation. That gives an insight into
the size of adjustment costs, an important issue because adjustment
costs are used to explain persistence in equilibrium business cycle
models. If the month-to-month variations within individual industries
are large, this indicates that adjustment costs are not as large as they
would have to be to make the persistence story carry through.
Bernanke and Powell's next empirical observation is thatin the post-
war period employers made greater use oflayoffs and less use ofhours
variations compared with their prewarbehavior. They suggest that this
was because workers laid off in the postwar period are in a better
position financially because of unemployment insurance and possibly
other programs than workers who were laid off in the earlier period.
Firms respond to the existence ofunemployment insurance by putting
their work forces on temporary layoff rather than by reducing hours.
Turning to the frequency analysis, they use deseasonalized log dif-
ferences-that is, rates of growth. Dummies are used to get out the
seasonal variation, a procedure I have used myself with monthly em-
ployment and output data. I was staggered by the size ofthe seasonal
adjustments, and I thought the authors might tell us more about what
they found. I found, for example, that the lowest-productivity month
in manufacturing was December, and that April had productivity over
7% higher thanthat. The high productivity months exceededDecember
by the equivalent of between one and two working days' output. I
found that rather implausible, and I am curious about what Bernanke
and Powell found. Some ofthe seasonal variation comes about because
of the way the data are collected. Employment is measured as of the
twelfth of the month, so that holidays such as New Year's Day or
Christmas reduce a month's apparent productivity.
After they remove the seasonal effects the authors look at the co-
herences, the phase relationships, among their different variables. Em-
ployment had the strongest coherence with output. Productivity and
earnings were next, and wages and output are not very coherent. I was
not sure how much to make of these results. They suggest that their
findings indicate that the cycle is dominated by movements in demand.
First, there are productivity gains as firms get people to work harder,
then they add extra hours, and finally they add workers. It was not
clear to me why this pattern showed that the cycle is demand driven~
For wages, they found in the prewar period that real wages lagged624 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
outputand in the postwarperiodreal wages were more orless coherent;
they even were leading in some industries. In other words, there was
no consistent lead or lag between wages and output.
The authors turn next to what they call the time domain and use
vector autoregressions. They found that output is exogenous and that
its movements were more persistent in the postwar period than in the
prewar. They found that hours and employment were not exogenous
but respond to each other and to output. These results do indicate that
output is driven by demand fluctuations, which then lead to hours and
employment variations. They suggest that the persistence of hours
indicates that there is an adjustment cost to hours variation. I did not
see that; the persistence might result from expectations. When a firm
decides whether to vary the number ofpeople employed or to vary the
number ofhours ofthe people already employed, it looks ahead to see
what future output is going to be, notjustcurrent output. So the finding
ofpersistencein hours variationindicates persistencein the expectation
offuture output. Their analysis ofwages in the time domain finds that
the real wage varies independent ofthe other variables. This confirms
the conventional wisdom that the real wage seems neither to drive nor
to be driven by employment and hours. The forecasting decomposition
says much the same as the results just described, and so I have no
additional comments on those.
The authors then turn to major recessions, using NBER reference
cycles, and they do not find that major recessions are very different
from minor ones. These results reemphasize the idea that that em-
ployers relied more on layoffs in postwar major recessions than in
prewarmajorrecessions. They pointoutthatproductivity moves some-
what differently when they consider NBER reference cycles rather
than correlating productivity with output in the same industry. Using
the reference cycles, productivity rises peak to trough, whereas the
relation with output is usually the other way. I think this finding is
because their industries do not move exactly in phase with the NBER
cycle. Manufacturing is typically out of phase with the overall cycle.
That completes my review ofthe paper and my detailed comments.
I will finish with a few general points. First, I may be biased, but it
seemed that contract theory did reasonably well out ofthese numbers.
That there was a difference in the prewar versus postwar layoffs and
hours decision is consistent with a contract framework. Employers are
responding to the income workers receive when they are not at the
firm. The lack of relationship between the wage variable and other
variables is also consistent with the contract framework.
My second general point is that the authors should have recognized
more clearly that there are micro results as opposed to macro results.
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there are results that hold at the aggregate level that would not nec-
essarily hold at the industry level. For exanlple, ifthere is a smoothly
functioning labor market in which workers can move easily from one
industry to another, then there is no reason for wages in a particular
industry to be related to the productivity or the employment or any
variable of that particular industry. Presumably firms pay the market
wage, and in a high-productivity growth industry relative price falls.
The finding of no relation between employment and the wage for a
single industry means something very different from a similar finding
for the whole economy. Even if there is not a perfectly mobile labor
force, it may be that labor unions will lock up relative wages. This is
another reason the wage in a particular industry may not be related to
employment, even though these variables could be related in the
aggregate.
The mention oflabor unions brings me to my next point. The authors
might have explored labor market institutions more fully. There were
many changes in the organization ofthe lahor market over the period
they were looking at. It would have been interesting to track these to
see if there was any relation between them and other variables. Labor
union influence fell in the early 1920s, then grew very rapidly in the
1930s with the New Deal and was strong in the postwar period. A
relatedinstitutional change was the growthofthree-yearwage contracts
in the postwar period. Perhaps these changes would have been unde-
tectable in the data, but that would have been worth knowing, too.
Another way of checking for the importance ofunions is that some of
their industries were unionized and some were not. Cross-industry
differences might have emerged.
My final point has to do with use offrequency analysis for studying
cyclical behavior. The cycle is not regular; different cycles have dif-
ferent durations. Moreover, in the postwar period there have been
several abrupt recessions, giving rise to spikes in the data. This means
that in a spectral decomposition, it would be better to hang on to the
high frequency end of the distribution to capture the spikes. And pos-
sibly the low frequency part of the distribution also carries cyclical
information. I do not think there is a narrow range offrequencies that
can be clearly identified as the cyclical component, such that all the
otherinformation can be thrown away. There is a danger ofnot picking
up relationships among variables when information is thrown away.
There were virtues to old-fashioned NBER cyclical analysis that rec-
ognized thatthe cycle is nota simple sine wave. Cycles do have different
durations, and booms and slumps are not of the same length and do
not have quite the same character.
I will stop here and again thank the authors for putting together a
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of it. I think they themselves will use the data more in the future to
set out what salient facts ofthe labor market are to be explained.
Comment Edward P. Lazear
Bernanke and Powell have presented us with a very fine piece ofwork.
Their contribution meets two of the necessary conditions for an im-
portant paper. First, it is informative, providing valuable data that are
summarized in an accessible form. Second, it is provocative. It stim-
ulates others to pick up where they left off.
The major point I would like to make should be regarded as an
extension rather than a criticism of what they have done. It is a point
I have made in another context,l but it seems important to make it
here as well.
Bernanke and Powell present detailed dataonafew important series
for the prewarand postwarperiods. The series they are most concerned
with are output, employment, productivity, and some measure of real
wages. Ofobvious importance is the relation ofreal wages to output.
Whether real wages are rigid over the business cycle is of central
concern to many macroeconomic theories. Although most of the im-
portant biases are discussed, there is one that is likely to be crucial
but that has been ignored in the past.
Truncation Bias
The point I want to emphasize is that workers are not homogeneous
and that the weights associated with various groups shift over the
business cycle. This really can be broken up into two points.
First, workers are not homogeneous. The proportion ofthe average
wage ofblack males compared with white males is approximately 0.7.
Similarly, the proportion for white females compared with white males
is about 0.6. Even within a demographic and/or occupational group,
there is a great deal of dispersion in wage rates. Among the most
important factors is experience, since wage rates tend to rise rapidly
during the first few years on the job.
Second, employment decreases are not spread randomly across all
worker classes. In particular, blacks, females, and less experienced
Edward P. Lazear is a professor in the Graduate School of Business at the University
of Chicago.
1. See the discussion in Lazear 1983 on the widening of union/nonunion wage differ-
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workers tend to be affected by recessions to a greaterextentthan other
groups.
What this implies is that the reported real wage in a recession refers
to a different set of workers than the real wage during an expansion.
Since these workers' wages differ, part ofthe movement in real wages
over the business cycle reflects a change in the weights rather than
some change in the wage itself.
This factor tends to suppress observed movements in wages over
the business cycle. Even though the entire wage distribution may shift
left in a downturn, there is a tendency for the lower tail ofthat distri-
bution to disappear. The observed mean might actually rise if enough
selective reduction in employment occurred in the slump.
To illustrate that this point is likely to be important in terms of
magnitude, I have used Bernanke and Powell's numbers to examine
the importance of this effect. What the next few paragraphs report is
that this weight-shifting effect may, and is even likely to, swamp every-
thing else.
Let us concentrate on only one factor. Suppose that workers are
homogeneous in all respects other than work experience or, almost
equivalently, age. The two facts from labor economics that are ofcen-
tral importance here are that experience/earnings profiles are positively
sloped and that layoffs are negatively related to seniority.
Figure CIO.l depicts a typical experience/earnings profile. (There is






Fig. CIO.l Experience/earnings profile.628 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. Powell
The profile is positively sloped and concave. Define W(t) as the wage
rate at experience level t and suppose that t goes from zero to thirty-
nine years. Normalize by defining W(O) = 1. The function shown in
figure CI0.1 can be approximated by
(1)
where
W(t) = [W(t - 1)] [1 + g(t - 1)],
(2) g(t) = .1 - .004t
= 0
for t ~ 25
for t > 25.
Equations (1) and (2) imply that wages grow initially at 10% per year
andthatthegrowthratedeclines linearlytozeroaftertwenty-five years,
at which point it remains zero.
Suppose that workers are distributed uniformly by experience group
so that initially, say at a peak, workers are found in equal numbers in
each of the experience categories between zero and thirty-nine years.
This distribution, coupled with the wage process described in (1) and
(2), yields an average wage for all workers taken together at the peak
of2.164. Recall that W(O) = 1. (This is derivedbycomputersimulation.)
Now think of moving from a peak to a trough as moving from one
standard deviation above the industry employment mean to one stan-
dard deviation below it. Further, suppose that layoffs are in reverse
order of seniority so that the least experienced workers are released
first. If the standard deviation is expressed in percentage terms, then
two times the standard deviation times thirty-nine years is removed
from the bottom ofthe distribution. Instead ofbeing uniform between
oand 39, it is now uniform between, say, 0.9 and 39.
Again, a meancanbe calculatedfor this truncateddistribution, which
applies during the recession. What is essential here is that the distri-
bution is not shifted at all, but the average wage will rise because the
lower tail is removed.
Table CI0.1 does exactly this using the Bernanke and Powell figures
from their table 10.6. That table reports the seasonally adjusted, busi-
ness cycle only variation in monthly growth rates ofemployment and
real wage by industry. The first entryfor each industry is for the prewar
period, and the second entry is for the postwar period. The last three
entries are only for the postwar period.
Column 1merely reproduces the employmentfigures from table 10.6,
and column 2 reproduces the real wage series from table 10.6 of Ber-
nanke and Powell. The most important information is contained in
column 3. Recall that the average wage was 2.164 when the entire labor
force was employed. What column 3 does is report the average wage
corresponding to the recession work force. For example, the first row
oftable C10.1 reports the information for the prewarperiod in the steel629 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Table CIO.l
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Steel 1.590 0.590 2.230 0.030 2.572
1.050 0.270 2.214 0.023 4.272
Autos 2.720 0.360 2.259 0.044 6.083
1.430 0.310 2.227 0.029 4.649
Meat 1.050 0.490 2.214 0.023 2.354
0.270 0.210 2.197 0.015 3.572
Paper 0.600 0.360 2.204 0.018 2.542
0.300 0.140 2.197 0.015 5.463
Shoes 0.470 0.680 2.201 0.017 1.249
0.390 0.170 2.199 0.016 4.760
Wool 0.690 0.670 2.232 0.031 2.337
1.010 0.220 2.213 0.023 5.143
Leather 0.970 0.470 2.212 0.022 2.361
0.490 0.140 2.201 0.017 6.138
Lumber 1.480 0.700 2.228 0.029 2.092
0.610 0.230 2.204 0.018 4.002
Coal 0.710 0.250 2.206 0.019 3.888
Electronics 0.160 0.130 2.194 0.014 5.360
Construction 0.750 0.150 2.207 0.020 6.619









industry. There the standard deviation of rnonthly growth rates was
1.59%. Under our assumptions, this implies that a recession truncates
the lower 3.18% of the distribution and raises the average wage from
2.164 to 2.230.
To get a feel for the magnitude of the effect, columns 4 and 5 are
presented. Column 4 reports the proportionate change in the wage that
results from this truncation effect. They range from 0.014 to 0.044, and
the effect measured this way is invariably smaller after the war than
before.
Column 5 compares this percentage change to two standard devia-
tions ofthe real wage growth rate. Those figures are perhaps the most
striking because they reveal that in every case the truncation effect630 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. Powell
exceeds two standard deviations of wage growth. This is true even
though the truncation effect was generated by only two standard de-
viations of employment reduction. In fact, in some cases it goes as
high as six times two real-wage standard deviations.
Additionally, the importance of this effect relative to the change in
wage rates has grown over time. For the most part, the postwar num-
bers in column 5 exceed the prewar numbers. Ofcourse, the standard
deviation of postwar wage rates may be low precisely because of this
effect.
Although this is only an example, the Bernanke and Powell data
show that truncation effects may well swamp everything else that goes
on in a time series of real wages. The numbers in table CI0.1 imply
that it is easyfor anygiven employed worker's real wage to drop during
a recession even though the average wage remains constant or even
rises. In the case of, say, postwar autos, the underlying wage distri-
bution could shift left by approximately 3%, and as a result of the
truncation effect the average wage would be observed to be constant
over the business cycle. That shift in wages would correspond to 2 x
(1.43%) drop in employment so that the actual, but unobserved, wage
movement would equal the employment movement.
This pointfinds potential supportnotonlyinthe BemankeandPowell
data, but also in a recent paper by Raisian (1983). Using panel data
(the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), he shows that the wage of a
given continuously employed worker falls significantly over the busi-
ness cycle. In fact, Raisian finds that a 1% increase in the unemploy-
ment rate ofa given worker's industry results in a 0.65% decline in his
wage. Obviously, truncation effects are absent in panel data.
Thereare some findings thatmight beexplainedbythis. Inparticular,
Bemanke and Powell show that employment adjustments are more
important in the postwar period. To the extent that employment ad-
justmentsare more likely to involve truncation effects hours reductions
(Le., they are more closely linked to seniority and wage levels), the
truncation effect would be more important in the postwar data. This
would tend to counteract procyclic movements in real wages. In fact,
Bemanke and Powell find that the real wage series is less variable
during the postwar period. A similar argument can be made to explain
the greater persistence of the real wage in the postwar data.
Ifthe truncation effect is important, then it helps to reconcile some
findings but makes others even more difficult to explain. In particular,
the procyclicality of productivity, termed SRIRL by Bernanke and
Powell, creates even more of a puzzle when we recognize that the
workers who retain theirjobs during the recession are the higher wage
group. Even though there may not be a perfect correlation between
wages and productivity, it seems reasonable that the relationship would
be positive. This means that SRIRL is even greater than it appears.631 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
The point is that truncation bias is likely to be an important force.
It can be dealt with explicitly, and it should be when drawing inferences
about the relation of real wages to the business cycle.
Other Points
A few additional points are worthy ofmention. They are listed in no
particular order:
1. The emphasis in this paper is on the time series within industry.
Yet, given the data, there is interesting cross-sectional evidence that
might be presented. For example, tables 10.5 and 10.6 report the
standard deviation within an industry over time. It would also be
useful to know whether industry variables like output, employment,
and real wages move in parallel across industries to a greater or
lesser extent in the postwar period. Are recessions more or less con-
fined to particular industries than they were in the past? It is con-
ceivable that changes in demand might reflect different relative shares
for the various products, leaving the aggregate output unchanged.
Alternatively, a fall in employment in one industry might be mirrored
in the same percentage fall in another industry. These data are ripe
for this type of investigation.
2. Related, an investigation ofthe sort conducted by Gordon (1982)
is feasible, but the analysis would be across industries rather than
across countries. In particular, one can imagine that there might be a
negative correlation between the effect of a fall in output on employ-
ment and on wages. In industries where wages are sensitive to changes
in demand for the product, is employment less sensitive?
Some minor points:
3. Since industry definitions are quite broad, it would be useful to
present more detail on what four- or five-digit industries make up the
aggregate and how this has changed over time. One could argue that
some of the results reflect weight shifts.
4. Is the hours figure reported hours worked or hours paid? This
might be important if vacation and sick time varies over the business
cycle.
5. In addition to reporting the phasing of real wages, and so on, to
output, it would be useful to provide some measure ofthe amplitudes
as well. A flat in-phase series has different implications than a highly
variable in-phase series.
6. Some reporting on the nominal wage and CPI separately would
be useful. One wants to know which of the two variables drives the
results. This is especially important when it is recognized that the CPI
is an ex post measure ofprices and may not be what the workerinserts
into his labor supply function.
7. I have argued elsewhere (Lazear 1974) that recessions are a time
for rebuilding and for investing in new technologies, including human632 Ben S. Bemanke/James L. PoweU
capital. My results suggest that this is true to some extent. Ifso, output
is relatively understated during downturns. Again, this may vary by
industry.
8. Since output is the numerator of the productivity measure, the
positive rank correlation reported in section 10.4 may reflect errors in
variables. Some investigation of this might be worthwhile.
The authors are to be applauded for a provocative and useful paper
that has already stimulated much thought and discussion.
Discussion Summary
The tone of the discussion was generally favorable toward both the
data set and the statistical methods employed in the paper. Most of
the comments involved suggestions for extensions or possible expla-
nations of puzzling results. There was general agreement that the
truncation example Lazear presented overstated his case. Even dur-
ing recessions a large proportion of separations come through retire-
ments and quits. As Summers noted, this upper truncation bias off-
sets the lower truncation bias elaborated by Lazear. Solomon
Fabricant suggested that another possible channel for the cyclical
behavior of productivity might be the production function. Bottle-
necks in the delivery of the amount or quality of materials and cap-
ital goods over the business cycle might produce cyclical behavior in
measured labor productivity. Robert Gordon felt that Bernanke and
Powell's conclusion 5 on the acyclicality of the real wage was an
artifact of their technique. If one were to remove the supply shocks
of the 1970s, in which the real wage was strongly procyclical, it would
be found that over the remaining business cycles the real wage moved
countercyclically.
Geweke noted that the presence of a linear relation between the
phase length ofa variable and the length ofthe business cycle, inves-
tigated in tables 10.9and 10.10did notnecessarily imply thata reference
cycle approachwas superiorto time domainmethods. ChristopherSims
issued a caution regarding Bernanke and Powell's results on the lack
of feedback from hours and employment to output. His experience
suggested that had hours times employment been used instead, more
feedback would have been found. Hence the results were sensitive to
the way the variables were allowed to enter. Sims also noted that
sampling errors in the interwardatamight be large enough to castdoubt
on the reliability ofthe results obtained. He suggested this might be a
profitable area for further investigation.633 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
References
Altonji, Joseph, and Orley Ashenfelter. 1980. Wage movements and
the labour market equilibrium hypothesis. Economica 47 (Au-
gust):217-45.
Anderson, T. W. 1971. The statistical analysis of time series. New
York: John Wiley.
Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Card. 1982. l~ime series representations
of economic variables and alternative models of the labour market.
Review ofEconomic Studies 49 (special issue):261-82.
Baily, Martin Neil. 1977. On the theory oflayoffs and unemployment.
Econometrica 45 (July):1043-63.
Ball, R. J., and E. B. A. St. Cyr. 1966. Short-term employment func-
tions in British manufacturing industry. ReviewofEconomic Studies
33 (July):179-207.
Barro, Robert J., and Herschel I. Grossman. 1971. A general disequi-
librium model ofincome and employment. American Economic Re-
view 61 (March):82-93.
Beney, M. Ada. 1936. Wages, hours, and employment in the United
States, 1914-1936. NewYork: NationalIndustrialConference Board.
Bernanke, Ben S. 1983. On the sources oflabor productivity variation
in U.S. manufacturing, 1947-1980. Review ofEconomics and Sta-
tistics 65 (May):214-24.
Bernstein, Irving. 1960. The lean years: it history of the American
worker, 1920-1933. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Bodkin, Ronald G. 1969. Real wages and cyclical variations in em-
ployment: A re-examination of the evidence. Canadian Journal of
Economics 2 (August):353-74.
Brechling, F. P. R. 1965. The relationship between output and em-
ployment in British manufacturing industries. Review ofEconomic
Studies 32 (July):187-216.
Brechling, F. P. R., and P. O. O'Brien. 1967. Short-run employment
functions in manufacturing industries: An international comparison.
Review ofEconomic Studies 99 (August):277-87.
Bry, Gerhard. 1959. The average workweek as an economic indicator.
Occasi~nal Paper 69, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Burns, Arthur F., and Wesley C. Mitchell. 1946. Measuring business
cycles. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chirinko, Robert. 1980. The real wage overthe business cycle. Review
ofEconomics and Statistics 62 (August):459-61.
Clark,Kim B.,andRichard B. Freeman. 1980. Howelasticisthedemand
forlabor?ReviewofEconomicsandStatistics62 (November):509-20.
Coen, Robert M., and Bert G. Hickman. 1970. Constrained joint es-
timation offactor demand and production functions. Review ofEco-
nomics and Statistics 52 (August):287-300.634 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. PoweU
Creamer, Daniel. 1950. Behavior ofwage rates during business cycles.
Occasional Paper 34, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Doan, T. A., and R. B. Litterman. 1981. RATS user's manual, version
4.1. Minneapolis: VAR Econometrics.
Dunlop, John T. 1938. The movement of real and money wage rates.
Economic Journal 48 (September):413-34.
Eckstein, Otto, and Thomas A. Wilson. 1964. Short-run productivity
behavior in U.S. manufacturing. ReviewofEconomics andStatistics
46 (February):41-54.
Fair, Ray C. 1969. The short-run demandfor workers and hours. Am-
sterdam: North-Holland.
Geary, Patrick T., and John Kennan. 1982. The employment-real wage
relationship: An international study. Journal ofPolitical Economy
90 (August):854-71.
Gordon, Robert J. 1980. The "end-of-expansion" phenomenon in short-
run productivity behavior. Working Paper 427, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
--. 1982. Why U.S. wage and employment behavior differs
from that in Britain and Japan. Economic Journal 92 (March):13-
44.
Granger, C. W. J., and M. Hatanaka. 1964. Spectral analysis ofeco-
nomic time series. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hall, Robert E. 1980. Employment fluctuations and wage rigidity.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:91-124.
Hannan, E. J. 1970. Multiple time series. New York: John Wiley.
Hause, John C. 1971. Spectral analysis and the detection of lead-lag
relations. American Economic Review 61 (March):213-17.
Hultgren, Thor. 1960. Changes in laborcostduring cycles in production
and business. Occasional Paper 74, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
---. 1965. Costs, prices, and profits: Their cyclical relations. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ireland, J. J., and D. J. Smyth. 1967. Short-termemploymentfunctions
in Australian manufacturing. Review ofEconomics and Statistics 49
(November):537-44.
Jerome, Harry. 1934. Mechanization in industry. New York: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The general theory ofemployment, in-
terest, and money. London: Macmillan.
---. 1939. Relative movements ofreal wages and output. Economic
Journal 49 (March):34-51.
Kuh, Edwin. 1960. Profits, profit markups, and productivity. Joint Eco-
nomic Committee Paper 15. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office.635 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
---. 1965. Cyclical and secular labor productivity in United States
manufacturing. ReviewofEconomics andStatistics 97 (February):1-
12.
Lazear, Edward P. 1974. The timing of technical change: An analysis
ofcyclical variations in technology production. Ph.D. diss., Harvard
University.
---. 1983. A competitive theory of monopoly unionism. American
Economic Review 73 (September):631-43.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1970. Capacity, overtime, and empirical produc-
tion functions. American Economic Review 60 (May):23-27.
Masters, Stanley H. 1967. The behaviorofoutputpermanduring reces-
sions: An empirical study ofunderemployment. Southern Economic
Journal 33 (January):388-94.
Medoff, James L. 1979. Layoffs and alternatives under trade unions in
U.S. manufacturing. American Economic Review 69 (June):380-95.
Mincer, Jacob. 1974 Schooling, experience, and earnings. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Mitchell, Wesley C. 1951. What happens during business cycles. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Riverside Press.
Moore, Geoffrey H. 1955. Business cycles and the labor market.
Monthly Labor Review 78 (March):288-92.
Morrison, Catherine J., and Ernst R. Berndt. 1981. Short-run labor
productivity in a dynamic model. Journal ofEconometrics 16 (Au-
gust):339-65.
Nadiri, M. Ishaq, and Sherwin Rosen. 1973. A disequilibrium model
ofdemandforfactors ofproduction. New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press.
Neftci, Salih N. 1978. A time-series analysis of the real wages-
employment relationship. Journal o.l Political Economy 86
(April):281-91.
---. 1979. Lead-lag relations, exogene.ity, and prediction of eco-
nomic time series. Econometrica 47 (January):101-13.
Oi, Walter Y. 1962. Labor as a quasi-fixed factor. Journal ofPolitical
Economy 70 (December):538-55.
Okun, Arthur M. 1962. Potential GNP: Its measurement and signifi-
cance. In Proceedings ofthe Business and Economics Section, 98-
104. Washington, D.C.: American Statistical Association.
Otani, Ichiro. 1978. Real wages and business cycles revisited. Review
ofEconomics and Statistics 60 (May):301-4.
Pindyck, Robert S., and Julio J. Rotemberg. 1982. Dynamic factor de-
mands and the effects ofenergy price shocks. Research Paper, Mas-
sachusetts Institute ofTechnology.
Raisian, John. 1983. Contracts,job experience, and cyclical labor mar-
ket adjustment. Journal ofLabor Economics 1 (April):152-70.636 Ben S. Bernanke/James L. PoweU
Ruggles, Richard. 1940. The relative movements of real and money
wage rates. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 55 (November):130-49.
Sachs, Jeffrey. 1979. Wages, profits, and macroeconomic adjustment:
A comparative study. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2
(1979):269-319.
---. 1980. The changing cyclical behavior of wages and prices:
1890-1976. American Economic Review 70 (March):78-90.
Sargent, Thomas J. 1978. Estimation ofdynamic labor demand sched-
ules under rational expectations. Journal ofPolitical Economy 86
(December):1009-44.
---. 1979. Macroeconomic theory. New York: Academic Press.
Sayre, R. A. 1940. Wages, hours, andemploymentin the United States,
1934-1939. Conference Board Economic Record2 10 (March):115-
37.
---. 1948. Consumers' prices, 1914-1948. New York: National In-
dustrial Conference Board.
Shiskin, Julius. 1961. Signals of recession and recovery. Occasional
Paper 77, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sims, Christopher A. 1974. Output and labor input in manufacturing.
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3 (1974):695-728.
---. 1980. Macroeconomics and reality. Econometrica 48 (Janu-
ary):1-48.
Slichter, Sumner H., James J. Healy, and E. Robert Livernash. 1960.
The impact ofcollective bargaining on management. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Solow, Robert M. 1968. Distribution in the long and short run. Pro-
ceedings ofa conference held by the International Economics As-
sociation at Palermo, ed. Jean Marchal and Bernard Ducrois. New
York: S1. Martin's Press.
---. 1973. Some evidence on the short-run productivity puzzle.
Development and planning: Essays in honour ofPaul Rosenstein-
Rodan, ed. Jagdish Bhagwati and Richard Eckaus. London: Allen
and Unwin.
Solow, Robert M., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1968. Output, employment,
and wages in the short run. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 82 (No-
vember):537-60.
Stock, James H. 1983. Economic models subject to time deformation.
Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley.
Stockman, Alan C. 1983. Aggregation bias and the cyclical behavior
of real wages. Research Paper, University of Rochester.
Tarshis, Lorie. 1939. Changes in real and money wages. Economic
Journal 49 (March):150-54.
Tatom, John A. 1980. The "problem" of procyclical real wages and
productivity. Journal ofPolitical Economy 88 (April):385-94.637 The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets
Woytinsky, W. S. 1942. Three aspects oflabor dynamics. Washington,
D.C.: CommitteeonSocial Security-Social Science ResearchCouncil.
Zarnowitz, Victor, and Charlotte Boschan. 1975. Cyclical indicators:
An evaluation and new leading indexes. .Business Conditions Digest
15 (May):v-xix.
Zeisel, Joseph S. 1958. The workweek in American industry, 1850-
1956. Monthly Labor Review 81 (January):23-29.